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Corporations grow and create value by investing. Corporate investment de-
cisions are impacted by, among other things, capital availability, the regulatory
environment, and internal agency conflicts. This dissertation explores how these
various factors influence corporate investment. Each of the three papers that com-
prise the dissertation explores how one of these three considerations affects invest-
ment decisions.
Chapter II examines the importance of capital market imperfections by inves-
tigating the dependence of a firm’s investment on its internal resources. I exploit
the tax loss carryforward feature of the tax code to establish that corporate invest-
ments are causally affected by the internal resources available to the firm. The de-
gree of dependence, in turn, is affected by the costliness of debt market financing.
Distributions to shareholders are not affected by incremental internal resources,
and borrowing actually increases with incremental internal resources. Firms re-
tain a significant portion of incremental cash flow. Taken together, these findings
confirm the existence of capital constraints imposed by costs of access to external
finance.
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Chapter III focuses on the regulation of financial reporting and its consequences
for the efficiency of investment in the economy. There is a significant body of evi-
dence indicating that firms inflate their performance reports prior to raising capi-
tal. I argue that such inflation may actually allow cash-poor firms to signal better
the quality of their investment opportunities and, therefore, lessen their cost of
financing. I show that separation is more complete if the penalty for fraudulent
disclosure is neither too lenient nor too severe and that allowing for greater sep-
aration reduces incentives for costly overinvestment. In equilibrium, investment
efficiency is maximized when the penalty for fraudulent disclosure is moderate.
Ex post investigation of disclosure fraud dominates ex ante auditing of the firm’s
accounts.
One dimension of investment that is likely to be important to corporate man-
agers is the risk that it entails. Risk aversion can cause undiversified managers
to make investment decisions that are not in the best interests of a firm’s non-
management shareholders. Chapter IV presents an explanation for the commonly-
observed link between managerial pay and stock price over the short term that
focuses on managerial risk-taking incentives. It is well accepted that aligning
managerial incentives with those of stock holders enhances shareholder value. In
theory models, such alignment is usually modeled as giving managers a stake in
the realized cash flows of the firm’s projects. However, such a stake, which entails
a manager holding on to her equity position until all cash flow uncertainty is re-
solved, can lead a risk averse manager to turn down risky positive NPV projects.
This chapter argues that equity-linked incentives can mitigate the manager’s bias
2
against assuming risk, provided the manager is allowed the flexibility of trading
out her equity position early. Thus, allowing managers to hedge away partially




Investment, Cash Flow and Financial Market
Conditions: Evidence from Tax Loss Carryforwards
The assumption of perfect capital markets is a bedrock of much of modern cor-
porate finance theory.1 Under this assumption, a firm makes decisions regarding
investment and financing policies separately. Capital market imperfections can,
however, drive a wedge between the costs of internal and external financing. As a
consequence, separation of investment and financing decisions breaks down, and
a firm’s investment activity can depend on the level of internal resources it has
available.2
An important stream of research has endeavored to examine the link between
internal resources and investment activity, with an eye to attributing such depen-
dence to capital market imperfections. However, establishing causality in this set-
ting is a challenge, as economic shocks are likely to affect both a firm’s current cash
1E.g. Modigliani and Miller (1958); Modigliani and Miller (1961); Stiglitz (1969).
2Frictions that may affect the cost of accessing eternal financing include adverse selection (Jaffee
and Russell (1976); Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984); Myers and
Majluf (1984)), incentive problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Grossman and Hart (1982); Stulz
(1990); Hart and Moore (1995); Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); ch. 3 of Tirole (2006)), and simple
transactions costs.
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flow and its investment opportunity set. A number of papers, starting with the
influential work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a), have confronted the
endogeneity problem by trying to show that, in the cross-section, investment is
more sensitive to cash flow for firms predicted to be more financially constrained
a priori. This approach has been criticized on the grounds that cash flow may be
a better proxy for investment opportunities for the types of firm that are typically
classified as more financially-constrained, even after controlling for proxies for in-
vestment opportunities (Poterba (1988); Erickson and Whited (2000); Alti (2003)).
In this paper, I re-examine the dependence of investment decisions on cash
flow, using the net operating loss (NOL) carryforward provisions of the U.S. Fed-
eral Income Tax code to construct a measure of cash flow that is purged of cor-
relation with investment opportunities. Corporate tax filers in the U.S. can carry
federal tax losses forward to offset against future taxable income.3 As a result,
a profitable firm with NOL carryfowards enjoys a greater cash flow than an oth-
erwise identical firm without such carryforwards. However, such a firm loses
its distinctiveness on this account as soon as it exhausts its loss carryforwards.
This abrupt change in its cash flow status allows me to examine how a firm’s in-
vestment behavior changes as it goes from availing itself of such deductions to a
situation in which it has completely exhausted such deductions.
Recognizing that the savings arising from the use of carryforwards represents
a source of cash flow allows for a new approach to testing the dependence of in-
3Firms are required to deduct such carryforwards against taxable income or face expiration of
their carryforwards.
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vestment on internal resources.4 These savings are a sharply nonlinear determin-
istic function of (a) the stock of carryforwards a firm has available and (b) its tax
profitability during the year. Controlling for these two variables, therefore, purges
the cash flow created by these savings of possible correlation with the firm’s in-
vestment opportunity set.5 The effect of this de-contaminated component of cash
flow on investment provides a clean estimate of the sensitivity of investment to
internal resources.6
Applying this approach to a large sample of firms covering the period 1969
through 2005, I find that investment is heavily dependent on a firm’s internal
resources. Capital expenditures increase by an estimated $0.35 for each $1 of in-
ternal resources generated. Non-parametric evidence shows a sharp decline in
the relationship between capital expenditures and a firm’s tax liability in the ab-
sence of carryforwards at the point at which carryforwards are exhausted. I also
find that other forms of investment, including working capital investment, cash
acquisitions, and advertising expenditures, increase substantially with internal re-
sources generated.
This evidence strongly supports the idea that investment is dependent on in-
ternal resources. This effect need not be constant over time, however. For ex-
4This source of cash flow is significant. For example, total savings due to NOL deductions
in 2003 totalled an estimated $24.5 billion according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) figures.
NOL deductions totalled approximately $70 billion, or 14% of total tax-book income (source:
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03co18tr.xls). The savings is estimated using the maximum
statutory tax rate for 2003 of 35%.
5For further discussion of the loss carryforward provisions of the tax code, see Graham (1996a,
1996b) and Scholes et al (2005).
6Rauh (2006) uses a similar testing methodology which takes advantage of a firm’s mandatory
pension contribution requirements. The approach also has similarities to the regression discon-
tinuity approach used in labor economics (van der Klaauw (1996); Angrist and Lavy (1999); and
Angrist and Krueger (1999)).
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ample, investment and financing decisions may be made separately when capital
market conditions are conducive to raising resources, but become linked when
capital market conditions are adverse.7 To assess the importance of capital mar-
ket conditions, I examine how the dependence of investment on cash flow from
carryforward savings varies over time with the spread between Baa- and Aaa-
rated corporate bonds. I find that the sensitivity of investment to this source of
cash flow increases with the bond spread. In fact, while capital expenditures are
highly sensitive to cash flow when the bond spread is high, they are insensitive
when the bond spread is low.
Finally, I examine other ways firms might use cash flow from carryforward
savings. With perfect capital markets, firms should distribute cash in excess of
their investment needs to their claimants. This should induce a positive relation-
ship between internally-generated cash flow and outflows to claimants. Further
refuting the perfect capital markets hypothesis, I find that distributions to equity-
holders are insensitive to cash flow. Moreover, firms actually increase debt in re-
sponse to additional cash flow. Finally, consistent with the conclusion of Almeida,
Campello and Weisbach (2004) that firms retain cash to reduce the probability of
future cash shortfalls, I find that cash holdings increase with additional cash flow.
My findings complement the results of other papers that have employed quasi-
natural experiments to identify the dependence of investment on internal resources.
Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) show that plaintiff firms increase
7Consistent with this idea, a small literature has found that shocks to the capital market’s ability
to supply capital affect firm decisions (e.g. Lemmon and Roberts (2007); Sufi (2007); Leary (2005);
Chava and Purnanandam (2006)).
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investment in response to windfalls from lawsuits unrelated to their ongoing lines
of business. Lamont (1997) shows that investment by non-oil divisions of con-
glomerates owning oil-producing divisions fell in response to a negative shock
to oil prices in 1986. Both of these papers, however, use very small, specialized
samples. In contrast, Rauh (2006) studies a larger sample of firms sponsoring de-
fined benefits pension plans and also finds that investment responds positively to
cash flows. While my paper’s test methodology is closely related to that adopted
by Rauh (2006), my sample is even broader-based, since all firms are subject to
federal taxation whereas all firms do not have defined benefit pension plans. In
addition, because of the length of my sample period, I am able to examine how
the investment-cash flow relationship varies with capital market conditions and
establish that the perfect markets benchmark may be quite a reasonable charac-
terization when the cost of accessing external finance is low.
While these quasi-natural experiments have generally found that investment
is affected by cash flow, two other recent papers have failed to find a depen-
dence of investment on cash flow, even for firms that are a priori most exposed
to higher costs of external financing (Erickson and Whited (2000); Pulvino and
Tarhan (2007)). These papers estimate empirical models specifically designed to
confront omitted variables problems that may affect direct tests of the investment-
cash flow relationship like those of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a). Like
Rauh’s (2006), my quasi-experimental set-up allows me to avoid many of the omit-
ted variables problems that are inherent in the direct approach to testing the im-
portance of cash flows to investment.
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In addition to providing fresh evidence regarding the relevance of internal re-
sources to investment activity, my paper makes three additional contributions to
the literature. First, my results help to pin down the magnitude of the effect of
cash flow on investment. It is difficult to infer this magnitude from investment-
cash flow regressions in early studies, since an economic shock that increases a
firm’s cash flow is also likely to improve its investment opportunities. The small,
specialized samples that Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) and La-
mont (1997) use in their quasi-natural experiments limit their ability to shed light
on the magnitude of the effect. Rauh (2006), in his large-sample quasi-natural
experiment, estimates that $1 of cash flow leads to between $0.50 and $0.80 of ad-
ditional investment. These estimates are surprisingly large, not least because they
suggest that traditional investment-cash flow regressions severely underestimate
the causal effect.8 My estimate of a $0.35 response of capital expenditures to a $1
change in cash flow from carryforward tax savings, on the other hand, is in line
with my estimate of the association of capital expenditures to total cash flow for
the same sample.
Second, my finding that investment is more sensitive to cash flow when cap-
ital market conditions are poor suggests that the magnitude of capital market
imperfections is important for investment decisions. This result provides direct
confirmation that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow in my research de-
8If economic shocks that increase cash flow simultaneously improve investment opportunities,
as is often conjectured, then investment-cash flow regressions should overestimate the effect of cash
flow on investment. Rauh (2006) finds that a $1 increase in total cash flow is associated with an
increase in capital expenditures of just $0.11. He argues that traditional investment-cash flow re-
gressions may underestimate the causal effect if, for example, profitable investment opportunities
arrive sporadically and generate cash flow with a lag.
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sign is, in fact, being driven by capital market imperfections. It also connects the
investment-cash flow sensitivity literature to the growing literature that looks at
the effect of capital supply on firm decisions. For example, Lemmon and Roberts
(2007) find that non-investment grade firms decreased investment in response to
an exogenous contraction in the supply of below-investment-grade credit in 1989.
Sufi (2007) finds that firms that obtain a syndicated bank loan rating after the intro-
duction of these ratings in 1995 increased their investment. Leary (2005) examines
the credit crunch of 1966 and finds that bank-dependent borrowers tend to substi-
tute equity for debt when bank lending is tight. Finally, Chava and Purnanandam
(2006) find that bank-dependent U.S. firms suffered negative abnormal returns
when U.S. banks suffered an adverse shock due to the Russian financial crisis of
1998, indicating that lack of access to capital constrains firm decision-making.
Third, I provide large-sample evidence that other uses of cash do not respond
to cash flow in a manner consistent with perfect capital markets. The fact that
outflows to claimants do not increase with cash flow suggests that firms do not
disgorge capital in excess of their immediate financing needs. The fact that firms
actually take on more debt in response to additional cash flow is consistent with
a particular form of capital market imperfections - that of financing capacity con-
straints driven by a firm’s pledgable assets (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); ch.
3 of Tirole (2006)). Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) find a similar
effect in their small-sample setting. I am able to establish this result in a large-
sample setting. The fact that cash balances increase with cash flow is consistent
with firms retaining cash to hedge against future cash flow shortfalls.
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Finally, my paper has important public policy implications. There is a large
public finance literature that has examined the effect of taxation on firm invest-
ment decisions.9 The focus of this literature has been on the effect of future
marginal tax rates on investment incentives. Mine is, to the best of my knowl-
edge, the first paper to examine the response of investment to the effects of tax-
ation on contemporaneous cash flow.10 The results suggest that investment can be
stimulated not only by permanent reductions in the tax rate, but also by tempo-
rary reductions in tax-related cash outflows, such as tax holidays, temporary tax
cuts, or deferred payment of taxes in low-investment periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground information, develops some terminology, and describes the methodology
used in the paper. In section 3, I provide detail about the variables used in the
empirical tests to follow and describe the sample. Section 4 presents the paper’s
results. Section 5 concludes.
2.1 Background and methodology
Examining the sensitivity of investment to cash flow has long been used to
investigate the importance of capital market imperfections for real investment de-
cisions. I begin by discussing the historical development of this approach in order
9See Hassett and Hubbard (2002) for a detailed review.
10Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988b) make the argument that, if firms have difficulty ac-
cessing external capital, taxes should have a contemporaneous effect on investment because they
affect cash flow. See also Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) and Hubbard (1998).
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to place my research design in context.11 I then discuss essential aspects of the
U.S. tax code and develop the terminology used in the paper. Finally, I describe
the methodology used in the paper more fully.
2.1.1 Investment and cash flow
How important are capital market imperfections for investment decisions by
firms? With perfect capital markets, internal and external funds should be perfect
substitutes, and investment and financing decisions independent. Capital market
imperfections that introduce a wedge between the cost of internal and external
funds can induce a dependence of investment on the availability of internal re-
sources. Therefore, establishing a link between investment and internal resources
can shed light on the importance of capital market imperfections.
Cash flow represents an accretion to a firm’s internal resources and hence
should be a determinant of investment if investment is dependent on internal re-
sources. However, productivity and demand shocks are likely to affect both cash
flow and a firm’s investment opportunity set. Thus cash flow may be a predictor
of investment opportunities. As a result, a simple test of the relationship between
investment and cash flow would suffer from an omitted variable bias. Different
strategies have been used in the literature in an attempt to isolate the causal effect
of cash flow on investment.
11Since the discussion is aimed at providing a foundation for the methodology employed in
this paper, it is not intended to be comprehensive. See the survey of Hubbard (1998) for a more
detailed discussion of the literature.
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One approach to establishing a cash flow effect is to examine how investment-
cash flow sensitivity varies cross-sectionally with variables indicating the likeli-
hood of a firm being financially constrained: If capital market imperfections cause
investment to respond to cash flow, then the relationship between investment and
cash flow should be stronger for firms that are more likely to be constrained.
Along these lines, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) examine the relation-
ship between investment and cash flow for subsets of firms formed on the basis
of their dividend payout ratios. For each of these subsets, they estimate the effect
of cash flow (CF) on capital expenditures (capex) using Tobin’s Q as a control for
the firm’s investment opportunities. The model that they take to the data is
Capexi,t = αi + γt + βCFCashFlowi,t + βQTobin′sQi,t−1 + εi,t, (2.1)
where the subscript i identifies the firm and t the time period. They predict that
firms with lower dividend payout ratios - which they argue are more likely to
be financially constrained - will exhibit stronger investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Consistent with this prediction, they report βCF’s of 0.254, 0.349 and 0.670 for
groups of firms with high, medium and low dividend payout ratios respectively.
Both the underlying hypothesis and the empirical methodology used by Faz-
zari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) have been subject to critical scrutiny. Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) argue that the assumption underlying Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen’s (1988a) hypothesis - that investment-cash flow sensitivity should be
greater for more constrained firms - need not be correct. They show that, with a
13
concave production function and convex external capital costs, predictions about
the effect of the level of a firm’s internal resources on the sensitivity of investment
to incremental internal resources can be ambiguous. In addition, they find that,
among firms with the lowest dividend payout ratios identified by Fazzari, Hub-
bard and Petersen (1988a), those that appear less financially constrained based
on management discussions in financial reports exhibit stronger investment-cash
flow sensitivities.12 Given these issues, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004)
argue that financing constraints are better investigated by examining the cash flow
sensitivity of cash rather than investment.
Whether Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen’s (1988a) methodology adequately
controls for cross-sectional differences in investment opportunity sets has also
been disputed. Poterba (1988) points out that there are reasons to believe that
the extent to which empirical Tobin’s Q proxies for investment opportunities is
likely to vary systematically with firm characteristics like dividend payout ratios.
He argues that this could lead to spurious differences in the investment-cash flow
sensitivity for subsamples formed on the basis of firm characteristics. Alti (2003)
simulates data from a model in which there are no financing constraints and con-
firms that spurious correlation can produce results quantitatively similar to those
of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a). Consistent with Poterba’s (1988) ar-
gument, Erickson and Whited (2000) find that systematic investment-cash flow
12Cleary (1999) provides large sample confirmation of the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
For further discussion, see also Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000), Kaplan and Zingales (2000),
Gomes (2001), Moyen (2004), and ch. 3 of Tirole (2006).
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sensitivity differences disappear when measurement error-consistent estimators
are used, even for firms they expect are most likely to be financially constrained.
A cleaner alternative to the Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) approach is
to utilize a quasi-natural experiment. This involves using cash flow variation that
is plausibly exogenous to a firm’s investment opportunity set to identify the effect
of cash flow on investment. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) find
that firms receiving lawsuit windfalls unrelated to their ongoing lines of business
usually increase investment in the same year. Lamont (1997) finds that the capi-
tal expenditures of non-oil subsidiaries of conglomerates with oil-producing sub-
sidiaries fell in response to a large negative shock to oil prices. Rauh (2006) shows
that a firm’s investment is depressed by its mandatory pension contributions, con-
trolling for the funding status of its pension plans. Since mandatory pension con-
tributions are determined solely by funding status, controlling for funding status
can be used to identify the cash flow effect of the mandatory contribution.13
My study also takes advantage of a quasi-natural experiment, using exogene-
ity introduced by the U.S. federal tax code to identify the direct effect of cash flow
on investment. While cash flow as a whole is likely to proxy for investment op-
portunities, my approach allows me to isolate a component of total cash flow that
is arguably free of such contamination. This enables me to obtain a relatively clean
estimate of the effect of cash flow on investment. Such a strategy also allows me
13In a paper somewhat related to these, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) find that an en-
trepreneur who receives an inheritance has a greater probability of continuing to operate as a sole
proprietor in the future and have larger operations, conditional on surviving, than an entrepreneur
who does not receive an inheritance.
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to examine in greater detail the importance of capital market imperfections for
investment decisions.14
2.1.2 Tax liability terminology and relationships
A publicly-traded corporation in the United States maintains two sets of ac-
counting books. While the financial statements of the firm are intended to convey
a firm’s financial state and performance, a firm’s tax books are designed for the
calculation of its federal income tax burden. Accounting and tax treatment differ
for many items, so financial and tax measures of profitability are generally differ-
ent. For this study, the relevant measures need to be drawn from the tax books. To
avoid unnecessary confusion, in what follows I clearly define the variables that I
need to implement the methodology used in this paper.
I define profits as the difference between a firm’s tax-book revenues and ex-
penses for the year.15 Taxable income, on the other hand, is the amount of income
that is subject to taxation by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In years in which
a firm incurs a loss on its tax books, it is allowed to carry forward the loss for
possible offset against future profits. These NOL carryforwards give rise to NOL
deductions in later years. In general, taxable income is derived from profits by
14My paper focuses on the effect of internal sources of finance on invsetment. Papers that ex-
amine the effect of external sources of finance on investment include those by Pulvino and Tarhan
(2006) and Kim and Weisbach (2008).
15Expenses include operational and financial expenses.
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subtracting claimed and allowable NOL deductions.16 Thus,
TaxableIncome = Pro f its− NOLDeductions. (2.2)
The amount of NOL deductions is limited by the level of profits earned during
the year. That is,
NOLDeductions = min{Pro f its, Carry f orwardsAvailable}. (2.3)
A firm’s actual tax liability is computed by applying the tax rate schedule to tax-
able income. Let τ(·) denote the tax schedule function.17 A firm’s actual tax lia-
bility is computed by applying the tax schedule to taxable income:
ActualTaxLiability = τ(TaxableIncome). (2.4)
16There are actually two categories of deductions that are subtracted - NOL deductions and
special deductions. Special deductions are deductions for dividend income. I ignore this form
of deduction here. In addition, NOL deductions can include both carryforward and carryback
deductions. The latter occur because the tax code allows losses to be carried backwards for up to
3 years to offset past tax profits. I focus on carryforward deductions in this paper.
17U.S. federal corporate income tax rates are, and have traditionally been, graduated. For exam-
ple, at present, corporations are taxed at a rate of 15% for the first $50,000 of taxable income, 25%
for income between $50,000 and $75,000, 34% for income between $75,000 and $100,000, 39% for in-
come between $100,000 and $335,000, and 34% again for income between $335,000 and $10,000,000,
35% for income between $10,000,000 and $15,000,000, 38% for income between $15,000,000 and
$18,333,333, and finally 35% again for income above $18,333,333. The rate schedule has varied
over time.
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I define pro forma tax liability as the taxes due if profits were taxed without apply-
ing NOL deductions first. Thus,
ProFormaTaxLiability = τ(Pro f its). (2.5)
This reflects tax liability driven solely by current year profits, irrespective of the
amount of carryforwards available as a result of historical tax losses.18 The dif-
ference between pro forma tax liability and actual tax liability is, then, solely at-
tributable to NOL deductions. Compared to an otherwise identical firm with no
NOL deductions, this difference corresponds to an actual extra cash flow that is
available for investment or distribution. The amount of this extra cash flow is
called NOL tax savings, where
NOLTaxSavings = ProFormaTaxLiability− ActualTaxLiability. (2.6)
A firm’s carryforwards available represents a stock that is augmented as the firm
experiences further tax losses and depleted as NOL deductions are used or the car-
ryforwards expire.19 The stock of carryforwards at any point in time, then, places
a ceiling on the amount of tax savings a firm can realize. I refer to this ceiling as
the firm’s tax savings capacity, which is calculated as the amount of NOL tax sav-
ings realized when a firm’s current profits just equal its carryforwards available.
18Equivalently, this would be the tax liability of an alternative firm with the same operations
which did not enjoy the tax benefits of loss carryforwards.
19Firms are currently permitted to carry losses forward for up to 20 years. This was increased
from 15 to 20 years in 1997, and from 5 to 15 years in 1981. The use of carryforwards is governed
by Internal Revenue Code §172(b)(1)(A).
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That is,
TaxSavingsCapacity = τ(Carry f orwardsAvailable) (2.7)
An example helps fix ideas. Suppose that a firm enters the year with $100 of
carryforwards available from prior tax losses and that the tax rate is a constant
40%. I consider three profit levels: $75, $100, and $125. The calculations of pro
forma tax liability, actual tax liability and NOL tax savings for each of these three
profit levels are below:
Profits $75 $100 $125
Tax rate 40% 40% 40%
Pro forma tax liability $30 $40 $50
Current year profits $75 $100 $125
NOL deductions $75 $100 $100
Taxable income $0 $0 $25
Tax rate 40% 40% 40%
Actual tax liability $0 $0 $10
Pro forma tax liability $30 $40 $50
Actual tax liability $0 $0 $10
NOL tax savings $30 $40 $40
Pro forma tax liability increases at the tax rate (40%) with profits. Actual tax
liability is $0 when profits are $75 or $100, since the amount of carryforwards
available ($100) is greater than or equal to the amount of profits, but is $10 when
profits are $125. This $10 represents the tax on profits in excess of the amount
of carryforwards available. Actual tax liability only increases with profits for the
amount of profits that exceeds carryforwards available. NOL tax savings are $30
when profits are $75. They increase to $40 when profits increase to $100, as an ad-
19
ditional $10 of savings are enjoyed (pro forma tax liability increases by $10 while
actual tax liability remains the same). However, they do not increase again as
profits increase to $125, as the firm’s caryforwards are already fully exhausted,
and pro forma and actual tax liability both increase by $10.
The connection between pro forma and actual tax liability is key to the method-
ology used in this paper. An incremental dollar of pro forma tax liability results
in an additional dollar of actual tax liability only if pro forma tax liability exceeds










NOL tax savings are the complement of actual tax liability. Holding fixed pro
forma tax liability, if NOL tax savings increase by $1, then actual tax liability de-
creases by $1, and vice versa. NOL tax savings can alternatively by written as
NOLTaxSavings = min{ProFormaTaxLiability, TaxSavingsCapacity}. (2.9)











The sharp nonlinearity in the relationship between NOL tax savings and pro
forma tax liability forms the basis for the empirical approach of this paper.20 Fig-
ure 2.1 presents a graphical depiction of the relationships among the tax variables.
2.1.3 Investment and NOL tax savings methodology
With the basic terminology introduced, I can now proceed to explain the method-
ology employed in this paper. As mentioned earlier, estimates of investment-cash
flow sensitivity derived from firm data suffer from the problem that current cash
flow may be correlated with investment opportunities. As a result, obtaining a
significant coefficient on cash flows in such regressions is not sufficient to estab-
lish a causal relationship between cash flows and investment.
In order to distinguish a causal effect, I construct a measure of cash flows that
is purged of associations with investment opportunities. As a first step to under-
standing this methodology, note that the total cash flows of a firm can be written
20This nonlinearity takes the specific form of a kink.
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as
CashFlow = PreTaxCashFlow− ActualTaxLiability
= PreTaxCashFlow− ProFormaTaxLiability + NOLTaxSavings.
(2.11)
Pre-tax cash flow and pro forma tax liability may both be correlated with invest-
ment opportunities if economic shocks affect both current profitability levels and
investment opportunities. NOL carryforwards available may also predict invest-
ment opportunities if past economic shocks affect both past profitability and cur-
rent investment opportunities.
I use the calculated NOL tax savings as a measure of cash flows that are not
contaminated by investment opportunities. Recall that this measure is entirely
determined by (a) pro forma tax liability and (b) NOL carryforwards available,
according to the formula
NOLTaxSavings = min{ProFormaTaxLiability, TaxSavingsCapacity}
= min{ProFormTaxLiability, τ(Carry f orwardsAvailable)}.
(2.12)
That is, when NOL carryforwards are not exhausted during the course of a year,
NOL tax savings are exactly equal to pro forma tax liability. However, as soon as
pro forma tax liability exceeds tax savings capacity, which is determined by the
amount of carryforwards available, NOL tax savings do not increase any further.
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It is this sharp discontinuity in slopes that I exploit to achieve clean identification
of the effect of cash flow on investment.
To see how this can be done, note first that investment is potentially related to
pro forma tax liability for two reasons: (a) profits affect investment directly and
(b) profits are related to investment opportunities. Since pro forma tax liability is
a monotonic transformation of profits, a regression of capital expenditures on pro
forma tax liability should produce a non-zero coefficient if profits are related to
investment. A similar outcome should be expected for NOL carryforwards since
they reflect past profitability.
As a result, an investment equation estimated with pro forma tax liability, NOL
carryforwards and pre-tax cash flow as explanatory variables may be expected to
have significant explanatory power. To the extent that NOL tax savings coincide
with pro forma tax liability, NOL tax savings would be redundant in the invest-
ment equation. However, NOL tax savings do not always coincide with pro forma
tax liability, as can be seen from (2.12). The sharply nonlinear relationship implies
that a non-zero coefficient on NOL tax savings can be attributed purely to cash
flow effects, unconnected with investment opportunities. This is because, first,
NOL tax savings are cash flows, and second, since pro forma tax liability and NOL
carryforwards available are in the investment equation, they already account for
any relationship NOL tax savings may have with investment opportunities. Based
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on this reasoning, the primary regression equation estimated in this paper is
Investmenti,t = αi + γt + βSavingsNOLTaxSavingsi,t
+βCarry f orwardsCarry f orwardsAvailablei,t
+βProFormaTaxLiabilityProFormaTaxLiabilityi,t
+βPTCFPreTaxCashFlowi,t + βQQi,t−1 + εi,t, (2.13)
where αi and γt represent firm and year effects respectively, and beginning To-
bin’s Q is included as a proxy for investment opportunities. The hypothesis that
I test using this specification is that cash flow causally affects investment. The
null hypothesis that investment is independent of cash flow can be written as
βSavings = 0. An estimate of βSavings > 0 indicates that firms, on average, respond
to an increase in internal resources by increasing investment. The identification
scheme can be interpreted graphically. Observe figures 2.2a and 2.2b.
In figures 2.2a and 2.2b, pro forma tax liability is shown as an increasing func-
tion of profits. The angle of this curve is determined by the tax rate, which is as-
sumed to be flat in the figures for simplicity. In figure 2.2a, the investment curve is
smooth as it passes through the point at which profits equal carryforwards avail-
able. This, in turn, indicates a smooth relationship between investment and pro
forma tax liability. The relationship between investment and pro forma tax liabil-
ity could arise due to either a direct effect of cash flows on investment, cash flow
proxying for investment opportunities, or both. Although the investment curve is
pictured as linear and increasing, neither of these assumptions need be true.
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In figure 2.2b, the slope of the investment curve abruptly decreases as the curve
passes through the point at which profits equal carryforwards available. This, in
turn, indicates that the relationship between investment and pro forma tax lia-
bility changes sharply exactly at the point at which NOL carryforwards are ex-
hausted and no further tax savings are realized.21 Unless the relationship between
investment and profits exhibits such a sharp change on its own, then the change
in slope must be related to the exhaustion of NOL carryforwards. Since the only
economic change that happens at this point is the cessation of cash flows gener-
ated through the utilization of tax shields, this change of slope can be attributed
to this effect alone.
NOL tax savings increase one-for-one with pro forma tax liability up to the the
point at which carryforwards are exhausted, but do not change with pro forma tax
liability beyond that point. Ignoring the other variables in the regression equation,
as pro forma tax liability changes up to the point at which carryforwards are ex-
hausted, expected investment changes at a rate of βProFormaTaxLiability + βSavings.
However, beyond this point, it only changes at a rate of βProFormaTaxLiability. If
βSavings is non-zero, then the slope of the relationship between expected invest-
ment and pro forma tax liability changes abruptly. This abrupt change identifies
the effect of NOL tax savings.
The presence of both controls (pro forma tax liability and carryforwards avail-
able) in the investment equation allows for clean identification of NOL tax savings
21This reaching of capacity is reflected in a change in the slope of the NOL tax savings curve
from positive to 0.
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as a pure cash flow effect. However, it is not guaranteed that the entire effect of
these controls on investment is captured by the linear specification employed. For
example, their total effects on the dependent variable may be better captured by
non-linear forms. Hence it is necessary to check whether the identification of cash
flow effects through NOL tax savings is robust to allowing for more complicated
forms of dependence of investment on the controls. In what follows, I allow sig-
nificant scope for non-linear representations of the control variables to ensure that
my identification strategy survives such perturbations.
The methodology employed in this paper is related to the approach of Rauh
(2006), who also investigates the effect of a cash flow variable that is a nonlinear
deterministic function of other variables. It is also related to the approach used
by Classen (1977) in investigating the effect of unemployment benefits on unem-
ployment duration. Classen is able to disentangle the independent effect of unem-
ployment benefits by taking advantage of the fact that unemployment benefits are
typically capped, so that they do not increase with pre-job loss income beyond a
specified point. If unemployment duration is related to the level of unemploy-
ment benefits, independently of any relationship through pre-job loss income,
then the relationship between unemployment duration and pre-job loss income
will exhibit a kink at the point of the cap. The sharpness of the kink measures the
independent effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration.
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2.2 Data and sample construction
The firm data used in this paper come from the COMPUSTAT database of an-
nual financial filings by publicly-traded firms. My sample period extends from
1969 through 2005. Pre-1969 data is not used because COMPUSTAT’s apparent
coding practice for the pre-1969 period limits its usefulness for my purposes.22
Tax rate data come from the U.S. federal corporate income tax schedules.23 I sup-
plement these data sources with data on corporate bond yields from the Federal
Reserve’s website, on seasoned equity issuance activity from Securities Data Cor-
poration (SDC) Platinum’s Global Issue database, on GDP growth from the Na-
tional Bureau of Economics (NBER), and on a firm’s geographic scope from the
COMPUSTAT segments database. In the rest of this section, I describe how I con-
struct my variables of interest and how I form my sample.
2.2.1 Variable construction
All of the variables described below are scaled by beginning-of-year total as-
sets (item 6, where item hereafter refers to COMPUSTAT item number).24 As de-
scribed in the previous section, investment is the dependent variable in the pri-
mary regression equation. Investment can take many forms. Consistent with the
22Prior to 1969, current tax expense is only broken out into federal, state and foreign current
tax expense if the firm did not end the year with unused NOL carryforwards. When current tax
expense is disaggregated, NOL carryforwards are missing. As I need data on both carryforwards
and current federal tax expense, I begin my analysis with 1969.
23Source for 1969-2003: Internal Revenue Service Publication 542, “Marginal Rates
of the Federal Corporation Income Tax, 1942-2003.” Source for 2004 and 2005:
http://www.smbiz.com/sbrl001.html.
24Results do not vary qualitatively if variables are scaled by total plant, property and equipment
instead.
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existing literature, I focus primarily on capital expenditures (item 128). However,
I also examine the effect of NOL tax savings on other forms of investment, which
are defined later.
Total firm cash flow is the sum of net income before extraordinary items (item
18) and depreciation and amortization (item 14). Since tax books are unavailable,
I use current federal income tax expense (item 63) to measure actual tax liability.25
Pre-tax cash flow is simply the sum of total cash flow and actual tax liability. Car-
ryforwards available are item 52. I discuss some of the known issues with using
COMPUSTAT current tax expense and carryforward data in the appendix.
Pro forma tax liability is calculated by grossing up actual tax liability to com-
pute taxable income, adding to this reductions in carryforwards during the year,
and then computing the hypothetical tax on this amount.26 NOL tax savings are
then the difference between pro forma and actual tax liability. Finally, Q is cal-
culated as the quotient of the market and book values of a firm’s assets. Market
value (the numerator) is book assets (item 6) plus the market value of equity (the
product of items 199 and 25) minus book equity (item 60) minus deferred taxes
(item 74). Book value (the denominator) is simply book assets (item 6).
25Current federal income tax expense is commonly used as an estimate of federal income tax
liability in corporate tax studies.
26This computation ignores the possibility that NOL carryforwards may simply expire. This
issue is acute prior to 1981, when carryforwards expired after only 5 years. As a robustness check,
I remove all pre-1981 observations for firms that reported positive carryforwards 5 years before
the year of the observation.
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2.2.2 Sample construction
I begin with all observations in the COMPUSTAT database from 1969 through
2005 for which beginning-of-year total assets exceed $10 million in 2005 dollars,
excluding firms in the financial industry (SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and
utilities (SIC code between 4900 and 4999).27 This initial sample contains 171,248
observations. The minimum size requirement reduces the noise created by small
denominators in the scaling of the variables.28 I then eliminate all observations
for which any of the variables described above are missing, which leaves 85,407
observations.
I next apply several screens to ensure the internal consistency of the data and
its appropriateness for my study. Observations for which current federal income
tax expense is less than 0 are eliminated, as these observations likely represent
either unprofitable firms using NOL carrybacks or encoding errors. Observations
for which current federal income tax expense is greater than 0 but ending NOL
carryforwards (item 52) are also greater than 0 are eliminated. Unless there are
restrictions on the use of carryforwards, either because they are foreign or because
they are acquired and subject to a section 382 limitation, a firm should not pay
taxes until all of its carryforwards are consumed.29
Observations for which current federal income tax expense is equal to 0 and
carryforwards increase during the period are eliminated. These likely represent
27Total assets are converted to the 2005 dollars using the consumer price index as a deflator.
28The results are very similar if a size filter is not imposed.
29After 1986, section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits the use in any year of carryforwards
obtained through an acquisition to the product of the value of the acquired firm’ stock before the
acquisition and the long-term tax exempt rate.
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cases in which a firm has suffered a tax loss and is accruing new carryforwards.
Pro forma tax liability is meaningless in this case and hence I do not include these
observations. Finally, observations are eliminated if both current federal income
tax expense and end-of-period carryforwards are 0.30 To test the importance of
these restrictions, I have in unreported results relaxed each individually and all
simultaneously, and verified that the paper’s results do not change qualitatively.
What remains is a sample of tax-profitable firm-year observations. For some
of these observations, the firm possess tax loss carryforwards with which to offset
some or all of its profits. The resulting panel consists of 52,409 observations for
7,785 firms. To reduce the influence of possible outliers, I winsorize capital expen-
ditures and lagged Q at the 99% level. Because of the deterministic mathematical
relationships among carryforwards available, pro-forma tax liability, actual tax li-
ability and pre-tax cash flow, I trim rather than winsorize these variables at the
99th percentile (and at the 1st percentile in the case of pre-tax cash flow, which
can take on negative values).31 This trimming reduces the sample to 50,967 obser-
vations for 7,369 firms. These data cover 37 years (approximately 1,377 observa-
tions per year) spanning multiple macroeconomic cycles. To take advantage of the
panel structure of the data, I employ first differences regressions throughout the
study. The first differenced data consists of 38,442 observations for 5,573 firms.32
30In principle, it is possible that a firm experiences pro forma tax liability just sufficient to exactly
consume all of its carryforwards, but this razor’s edge scenario seems unlikely, and encoding error
seems a more plausible explanation.
31I have re-obtained the paper’s results using various approaches to mitigating the potential
effects of outliers.
32First differencing requires that a firm be in the sample in consecutive years. This eliminates
5,967 observations. The first differencing itself reduces the sample size by another 8,000 observa-
tions.
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Figure 2.3 summarizes the distribution of the sample over time. Several fea-
tures are noteworthy. First, there is a decline in the total number of observations
from the 1970s to the 1980s. While the number of firms in COMPUSTAT increases
over this period, the proportion of firms with missing values reported for NOL
carryforwards (item 52) or current federal tax expense (item 63) also increases.
Second, there is a steady decline in total observations beginning in the late 1990s.
This is driven by a decrease in the number of firms reported by COMPUSTAT
during this period.
Third, the number of firms in the sample using NOL carryforwards exhibits
some cyclicality, with peaks in 1976, 1987 and 2002. Finally, the savings generated
by carryforwards for firms in the sample increases sharply in 2002, and remains
high afterwards. Firms suffered tremendous tax losses in 2000 and 2001, which for
many that survived resulted in large tax savings after they returned to profitability
in 2002.33
Panel A of table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of 50,967
observations. This sample represents a broad cross-section of COMPUSTAT firms.
Panel B compares observations in the sample for firms with NOL carryforwards
available to those lacking carryforwards. Loss carryforward firms are, on average,
younger, smaller, less profitable, and more highly-leveraged than firms lacking
carryforwards. The relatively low profitability is not surprising since carryfor-
ward firms by definition have suffered losses - at least on a tax basis - in the recent
33In unreported results, I have verified that the paper’s results are very similar if observations
in years after 2001 are excluded from the sample.
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past. It is also apparent that many of the carryforward firms in the sample have
only been publicly-traded for a short time. Interestingly, though, Tobin’s Q does
not vary substantively between the two subsamples. This, combined with the
fact that all firms in the sample are profitable on a tax basis in the current year
by construction, suggests that carryforward firms in the sample cannot be readily
categorized as “distressed” firms. In robustness checks, I apply filters to the sam-
ple to ensure that the results obtained in the paper are not driven by relatively
recent IPOs or small firms.
2.3 Results
This section presents the paper’s results. The methodology developed in sec-
tion 2 is employed throughout. I begin by showing that capital expenditures re-
spond positively to NOL tax savings, controlling for pro forma tax liability and
carryforwards available (section 4.1). This indicates that a firm’s capital expendi-
tures are causally affected by its internal resources. I also show that several other
measures of investment also respond positively to an increase in cash flow (section
4.2). I then investigate whether the sensitivity of investment to cash flow varies
with firm-specific characteristics that have been used in the literature as proxies
for accessibility of external capital (section 4.3). I find, with one notable exception,
that these proxies do not reliably predict investment-cash flow sensitivities in the
cross-section.
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Next, I investigate whether the sensitivity of investment to cash flow varies
with capital market conditions (section 4.4). I use the spread between Moody’s
Baa- and Aaa-rated corporate bond yields to measure capital market conditions. I
show that the sensitivity of capital expenditures to cash flow from NOL tax sav-
ings increases as capital market conditions worsen. In fact, capital expenditures
are generally insensitive to cash flow when capital market conditions are at their
most favorable. I also show that capital market conditions matter more for firms
that are less established in capital markets - those with no credit rating.
Finally, I examine the effect that cash flow has on distributions to shareholders
and cash retentions, as well as borrowing and debt repayment (section 4.5). I find
that neither dividend payouts nor share repurchases respond to NOL tax savings.
Consistent with the arguments of Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and
others that firms retain cash flow in anticipation of future financing constraints,
NOL tax savings result in growth in cash balances. Last, I find that, not only do
firms forgo using additional cash flow to repay debt, but they actually increase
debt levels in response to greater cash flow from NOL tax savings.
2.3.1 NOL tax savings and capital expenditures
I now present the paper’s results in detail. Most of these results are obtained
through regression analysis. As a preliminary note, all regressions throughout the
paper include year effects. Unless otherwise noted, all regressions are run in first
differences to account for firm fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard
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errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses below each point
estimate.
I begin by examining the impact of cash flow on capital expenditures. The re-
sults are summarized in table 2.2. The dependent variable in all regressions in this
table is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year assets. All explanatory
variables are also scaled by beginning-of-year assets, except for Tobin’s Q. Con-
sistent with previous investment-cash flow sensitivity papers, lagged Tobin’s Q is
included in all regressions, though its exclusion has no qualitative effect on the
results.
As a starting point, I verify that capital expenditures are positively associated
with total cash flow. In column 1, the only explanatory variable is total cash flow.
A $1 increase in total cash flow is associated with a highly statistically significant
$0.313 increase in capital expenditures. This is similar to existing estimates.34
Next, I investigate the relationship between capital expenditures and actual
tax liability. Total cash flow can be disaggregated into pre-tax cash flow and actual
tax liability. Along with lagged Q, these are the explanatory variables in column 2.
Controlling for pre-tax cash flow, the coefficient on actual tax liability is negative,
large and statistically significant. While this is consistent with a cash flow effect of
taxation, actual tax liability may continue to be endogenous even after controlling
34Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) estimate that a $1 increase in cash flow is associated
with increases in capital expenditures of $0.67, $0.35 and $0.25 for three different groups of firms
during the period 1970-1984. Rauh (2006) estimates that a $1 increase in cash flow is associated
with a $0.11 increase in capital expenditures for a set of firms during the period 1990-1998. I obtain
similar estimates to those of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Rauh (2006) if I restrict my
sample to the same years included in each of their studies respectively.
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for pre-tax cash flow. Thus it may not be a good instrument for examining the
effect of tax-related cash flow on investment.
I now implement the identification strategy using NOL carryforwards described
in section 2. Column 3 contains the results from estimating the primary regression
equation in (2.13) for capital expenditures. The variable of primary interest is the
NOL tax savings variable. Controlling for pro forma tax liability, NOL carryfor-
wards available, pre-tax cash flow and lagged Tobin’s Q, the coefficient on NOL
tax savings is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient
indicates that a $1 increase in internal resources results in an estimated increase
in capital expenditures of $0.345 that is not contaminated by a firm’s investment
opportunity set. Comparing this estimate to the coefficient on total cash flow in
column 1 suggests that estimates from simple investment-cash flow regressions
are not substantively biased upwards or downwards.
The coefficient on pro forma tax liability is -0.638 and is highly statistically
significant. Because this variable may be endogenous, it is not clear how one
should interpret this coefficient in isolation. However, what can be said is that,
controlling for pre-tax cash flow, $1 of pro forma tax liability that is not shielded
by loss carryforwards is associated with a fall in investment of $0.638, while $1
of pro forma tax liability that is shielded from taxation is associated with a fall in
investment of only $0.293.
Capital expenditures do not appear to vary with the amount of NOL carry-
forwards a firm has available. Auerbach and Poterba (1986) argue convincingly
that the predicted effect of NOL carryforwards on investment is ambiguous. The
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availability of NOL carryforwards reduces the firm’s marginal tax rate, thereby
increasing after-tax returns to investment, which provides stronger incentives to
invest. On the other hand, capital expenditures generate depreciation tax shields.
To the extent that these are substitutes for NOL tax shields, incentives to invest
are weakened when a firm has significant carryforwards. In unreported results,
carryforwards available are positively but weakly associated with capital expen-
ditures if the amount of tax savings is not included in the regression. NOL tax
savings appear to subsume this effect.
The inclusion of pro forma tax liability and carryforwards available is intended
to purge the coefficient on NOL tax savings of any spurious correlation through
investment opportunities. While column 3 presented results based on this speci-
fication, the controls need not be linearly related to investment opportunities. As
NOL tax savings are determined by these controls, nonlinearities in the underly-
ing relationships could bias the coefficient on NOL tax savings. I confront this
possibility by adding the second and third powers of pro forma tax liability and
carryforwards available to the main specification. The results are presented in
column 4. The coefficient on NOL tax savings increases to 0.408 when the higher
powers of the control variables are added, and remains statistically significant
at the 1% level. Adding additional powers of pro forma tax liability and NOL
carryforwards available has negligible effect. Nonlinear relationships between in-
vestment opportunities and the variables that determine NOL tax savings do not
appear to be driving the paper’s results.
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A sufficient assumption for unbiased estimation using first differences is that
the error term in the true model follows a random walk. If this assumption is
violated, then first differences estimates could be biased because first differences
regressions will yield autocorrelated residuals. For example, negative autocor-
relation of the residuals in the first differences model is expected to occur if the
error term is independently distributed. Column 5 replicates column 3 using the
Prais-Winsten transformation (see Prais and Winsten 1954) to allow for the possi-
bility of first-order autocorrelation in the residuals. The estimated autocorrelation
coefficient from the regression is -0.30, suggesting that autocorrelation in the sim-
ple first differences regressions is potentially an issue. However, the coefficient
on NOL tax savings actually increases slightly to 0.368 in this specification, and
remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
In column 6, I re-estimate the primary specification using firm fixed effects
instead of first differences. For comparability with the first differences results,
I include an observation only if an observation for the same firm is available in
either the year before or year after. The coefficient on NOL tax savings jumps in
the firm fixed effects regression to 0.582 and is statistically significant at the 1%
level.
I turn next to non-parametric analysis to further investigate the response of
capital expenditures to cash flow created by NOL tax savings. I begin by re-
gressing capital expenditures on a number of non-tax variables that one would
expect to be important determinants of investment, including pre-tax cash flow,
lagged Tobin’s Q, and firm and year fixed dummies. I then use the residuals
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from the first stage as a dependent variable in a kernel regression, with a vari-
able that I call DistanceToKink as the independent variable. DistanceToKink is
defined as (ProFormaTaxLiability − TaxSavingsCapacity), scaled by beginning-
of-year total assets. TaxSavingsCapacity is the maximum amount of tax that can
be avoided in the period using loss carryforwards. See section 2.2 for a formal def-
inition of TaxSavingsCapacity. If DistanceToKink is negative, then the firm does
not exhaust its carryforwards in the current year and therefore pays no taxes.
The closer this value is to 0, the closer the firm is to completely exhausting its
carryforwards. When DistanceToKink is 0, the firm just exhausts its carryfor-
wards. DistanceToKink is positive if the firm’s carryforwards are insufficient to
fully shield the firm from tax liability.
The results of the kernel regression appear in figure 2.4. The kernel regression
employs the Epanechnikov kernel, with a bandwidth of 0.02. A sharp downward
kink is readily observed at the point at which DistanceToKink equals 0. Consistent
with the results in table 2.2, an increase in pro forma tax liability that does not ac-
tually result in a cash outflow has little effect on capital expenditures. An increase
in pro forma tax liability that actually creates tax liability has a dampening effect
on investment. The effect of crossing the threshold from one regime to the other
appears to be quite sharp.
2.3.2 NOL tax savings and other forms of investment
While empirical models of investment typically focus on capital expenditures,
corporate investment activity can take many other forms. For example, a firm can
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invest in working capital, use cash to acquire another firm, undertake research
and development, or invest in market share by advertising. It can also increase
its production capacity by leasing additional production assets. Existing evidence
of the dependence of these forms of investment on the availability of internal re-
sources is limited. I now test whether the availability of internal resources impacts
the pursuit of these other forms of investment.
In table 2.3, I present results from estimation of the primary regression equa-
tion, where the dependent variables are investment variables other than capital
expenditures. The dependent variable varies by column. The number of observa-
tions varies based on the availability of data for each of the dependent variables in
COMPUSTAT. The dependent variables are change in working capital (column 1),
cash acquisitions (column 2), advertising expense (column 3), rental expense (col-
umn 4), and research and development expense (column 5).35 All dependent vari-
ables are scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The NOL tax savings coefficient is
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better in the working capital
investment, acquisitions, advertising expenses, and rental expenses regressions.
This indicates that each of these forms of investment is dependent on a firm’s in-
35Change in working capital is defined as working capital at the end of the current year less
working capital at the end of the previous year, where working capital is inventory (COMPUSTAT
item 3) plus accounts receivable (item 2) less accounts payable (item 70). Cash acquisitions are
item 129. Advertising expense is item 45. Rental expense is item 47. Research and development is
item 46, with zero substituted if the the value is missing in COMPUSTAT.
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ternal resources.36 Research and development, on the other hand, does not appear
to respond to an increase in internal resources.37
2.3.3 NOL tax savings and capital expenditures in the cross-section
The results presented thus far indicate that cash flow has a significant positive
effect on investment for the full sample. Researchers have developed a number
of proxies for the extent to which any individual firm is financially constrained in
an effort to test whether investment is more sensitive to cash flow for more con-
strained firms. While I take no position on the reasonableness of these proxies, I
now investigate whether these characteristics predict which firms exhibit greater
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. I continue to use NOL tax savings to iden-
tify the effect of cash flow.
The first proxy is the commonly-used Kaplan-Zingales 4-variable index of fi-
nancing constraints.38 The second is the index of Whited and Wu (2006). This
index is computed using quarterly data. I use the mean quarterly value of the
36The finding that working capital investment is sensitive to cash flow is consistent with the
finding of Fazzari and Petersen (1993) that working capital and fixed investment compete for
funding from a firm’s pool of available finance. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994)
report evidence that acquisitions respond to cash flow.
37Evidence in the literature on the response of research and development to internal resources is
mixed. For example, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) find a positive association between spend-
ing on R&D and cash flow for a sample of very small firms. On the other hand, a number of earlier
papers found no evidence of such a relationship for a broader sample of firms.








where CF is cash flow (item 14 + item 18), Div is common and preferred dividends paid (item
19 + item 21), Cash is cash balance (item 1), Assets are total book assets (item 6), and Lev is book
leverage ((item 9 + item 34)/(item 9 + item 34 + item 216)). The higher the value of the index, the
greater the predicted likelihood that a firm faces financing constraints. The index was first used as
an instrument for measuring financing constraint severity by Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003). It is
derived from work by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001).
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index for the year.39 The third is a firm’s net leverage, which is debt (the sum of
COMPUSTAT items 9 and 34) less cash and equivalents (COMPUSTAT item 1),
scaled by total assets. The fourth proxy is an indicator variable that takes a value
of 1 if the firm paid dividends in the most recent year and 0 if it did not. The
fifth is an indicator for whether the firm has a Standard and Poor’s credit rating. I
measure each of the variables at the beginning of each year.
I begin by re-estimating the primary regression equation, adding the Kaplan-
Zingales index and its interaction with each of the right-hand side terms of the
primary regression equation as additional explanatory variables. I then repeat the
exercise using each of the other proxies for financing constraints in place of the
Kaplan-Zingales index. The variable of interest in each of the resulting five re-
gressions is the interaction of NOL tax savings and the financing constraint proxy.
The results are presented in table 2.4. The number of observations in each col-
umn varies slightly with the availability of data in COMPUSTAT for computing
the financing constraint proxies. Only the coefficients on NOL tax savings, the
financing constraint proxies, and their interactions are presented in the interest of
conserving space.
The financing constraint proxies on the whole appear to have little predictive
power over the response of investment to cash flow from NOL tax savings. Only
39The Whited and Wu (2006) index is computed as
−0.091 CFi,t
Assetsi,t
− 0.062DIVPOSi,t + 0.021
LTDi,t
Assetsi,t
− 0.044ln(Assetsi,t) + 0.102ISGi,t − 0.035SGi,t,
where DIVPOS equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend and 0 if it does not, LTD is long-term debt
(item 9), ISG is industry sales growth rate, and SG is firm sales growth rate.
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one - the credit rating indicator - has an effect that is statistically significant at the
5% level. Consistent with the findings of Whited (1992), investment appears to
be significantly more sensitive to cash flow for firms lacking credit ratings. This
suggests that ready access to the public debt market is important in providing
a firm with the flexibility to undertake investments. I show shortly that this is
especially true when credit market conditions are poor.
2.3.4 NOL tax savings, investment and capital market conditions
Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a), it has been customary to test
whether investment-cash flow sensitivity varies systematically with characteris-
tics believed to proxy for the degree to which a firm is financially constrained.
This is, however, an indirect way of testing whether sensitivity depends on the
costs of accessing financial markets. In principle, one could also take advantage
of the fact that costs of accessing external capital markets seem to vary dramati-
cally over time.40 If my identification strategy has power, then it should also have
explanatory power with respect to time-varying costs of access to capital markets.
I measure the cost of accessing external capital annually using the average
spread for the year between Baa- and Aaa-rated corporate bonds, as rated by
Moody’s.41 Widening of this spread indicates a decline in the external financial
market’s willingness to fund risky investment. The spread ranges between 0.60%
and 2.33% during the sample period. To simplify interpretation, I subtract 0.60%
40For example, loss of access to inexpensive debt financing appears to have drastically curtailed
mergers and acquisitions activity starting in mid-2007.
41Source: Federal Reserve website. The yield series are provided on a monthly basis.
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from the spread in each year, so that the spread variable is the spread relative to
the lowest spread during the sample period. To investigate how the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow varies with the cost of accessing external capital, I aug-
ment the paper’s main specification with the spread and its interaction with each
of the explanatory variables.
The results are presented in column 1 of table 2.5. The dependent variable
is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year assets. For brevity, only the
coefficients on NOL tax savings, the spread, and the interaction between the two
are shown in the table. The coefficient on the interaction of NOL tax savings with
the bond spread shows that the sensitivity of capital expenditures to cash flow
is sharply increasing in the bond spread. A 10 basis point increase in the spread
increases the response of capital expenditures to a $1 increase in cash flow by more
than $0.06. The coefficient on NOL tax savings itself indicates that investment is
insensitive to cash flow when the bond spread is low.
The cost of accessing external finance is unlikely to affect all firms equally.
Firms that are established in the capital markets are less likely to face adverse se-
lection, while unestablished firms may face substantial barriers to raising capital
when conditions are unfavorable. The effect of the cost of accessing external capi-
tal on the dependence of investment on cash flow should be greater for relatively
unestablished firms.
I use as a proxy for how established a firm is in the credit market an indicator
variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm has a credit rating and 0 if it does not.
I then replicate the regression in column 1, but include also triple interactions of
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the credit rating indicator with NOL tax savings and bond spread. The results of
this regression are presented in column 2. The coefficient on the triple interaction
term is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that the sensitivity of
investment-cash flow dependence to the bond spread is greater for firms that lack
credit ratings.
The spread between high- and low-grade bonds directly measures the cost of
obtaining risky capital through external markets. The evidence shows that invest-
ment is more sensitive to cash flow when this spread is high. I supplement this
result using an alternative measure of capital market accessibility based on aggre-
gate SEO issuance activity. When the cost of accessing external capital is high,
firms should avoid or delay secondary equity issues, and aggregate SEO activ-
ity should be low. The variable inverse SEO intensity is determined by the total
number of SEOs reported by SDC during the year of the observation. The variable
takes a value of 0 in the 12 years with the most SEOs, 2 in the 12 years with the
fewest SEOs, and 1 in the 13 intermediate years.
I replicate the test presented in column 1, with inverse SEO intensity in place
of bond spread. The results are shown in column 3. The coefficient on NOL tax
savings indicates a relatively small, statistically insignificant average investment-
cash flow sensitivity of 0.163 when aggregate SEO intensity is high. The coefficient
on the interaction of NOL tax savings and inverse SEO intensity is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.061). This shows that invest-
ment becomes more sensitive to cash flow when SEO issuance activity declines.
The point estimate indicates that moving from a high SEO intensity to a low SEO
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intensity year increases investment-cash flow sensitivity by 0.332, or more than
200% of the estimated sensitivity in high SEO intensity years. This result further
supports the idea that investment-cash flow sensitivity increases when accessing
capital markets is more costly.
Capital market conditions are likely to co-vary with economic conditions. Investment-
cash flow sensitivities may respond to economic conditions as well as capital mar-
ket conditions. This could complicate interpretation of results connecting capital
market conditions to investment-cash flow sensitivities. I remove this source of
possible contamination by augmenting the regressions presented in columns 1
and 3 of table 2.5. Specifically, I add real GDP growth and its interactions with
the right-hand side variables of the primary regression equation. The results are
presented in columns 4 and 5 respectively. The coefficients on the interactions
of NOL tax savings with bond spread and SEO intensity maintain their sign and
statistical significance, and are of virtually the same magnitude, when the GDP
growth variables are added. This indicates that the relationship between capital
market conditions and investment-cash flow sensitivities is not driven by changes
in economic conditions.42
42It has been argued that poor economic conditions are associated with low capital market acces-
sibility. This could occur because tight monetary policy both retards economic growth and limits
capital availability, or because adverse selection in the capital market worsens during economic
downturns. Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find evidence that
recessions are characterized by inaccessibility of external finance. The negative coefficient on the
interaction of NOL tax savings and GDP growth in columns 4 and 5 supports this argument.
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2.3.5 NOL tax savings and outflows to claimants
The evidence presented thus far suggests that investment responds to cash
flow, which is inconsistent with perfect capital markets. Investment, though, is
just one of many possible uses of incremental cash flow. Further insight into the
importance of capital market imperfections can be obtained by examining other
ways firms can use incremental cash flows.
If capital markets are perfect, excess cash flow is simply distributed to a firm’s
claimants, creating a mechanical relationship between outflows to claimants and
cash flow. This relationship may not hold in the presence of capital market imper-
fections, however, as extra cash is either invested by financially-constrained firms
or saved for use in the future. I now investigate how outflows to claimants and
cash balances respond to cash flow. I again use the specification in (2.13) to isolate
the cash flow effects of NOL tax savings, with outflow variables and cash balance
replacing investment as the dependent variable. The results are presented in table
2.6.
I first investigate whether firms distribute additional cash flow to their share-
holders. The dependent variables in the first two columns of table 2.6 are div-
idends (item 21) and share repurchases (item 115) respectively, both scaled by
beginning-of-year assets. The coefficient on NOL tax savings is small and statisti-
cally insignificant in both specifications. The evidence does not support a causal
connection between cash flow and distributions to shareholders.
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Rather than increase distributions to shareholders, firms with additional cash
may forgo issuing equity that they would otherwise issue. In this case, equity is-
suance would decline with cash flow. This possibility is investigated in column 3,
where the dependent variable is equity issuance (item 108), scaled by beginning-
of-year assets. If firms reduce equity issuance in response to additional cash flow,
then the coefficient on NOL tax savings should be negative. Column 3 shows that
this coefficient is actually positive, though it is statistically insignificant. Firms do
not appear to reduce equity issuance in response to additional cash flow.
Another way in which firms can return additional cash to claimants is by re-
ducing debt. The dependent variable in column 4 is change in debt scaled by
beginning-of-year assets, where debt is the sum of long-term debt (item 9) and
debt in current liabilities (item 34). If firms use additional cash to reduce debt, the
coefficient on NOL tax savings in this regression should be negative. Instead, the
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that
firms actually increase debt in response to additional cash flow, which is difficult
to reconcile with a perfect capital markets interpretation.43
The results in columns 1 through 4 suggest that firms do not respond to addi-
tional cash flow by returning cash to equity or debt claimants or by raising less
43Firms increasing debt in response to additional cash flow is is consistent with a particular form
of capital market imperfections. Firms may have limited external borrowing capacity because they
have a limited stock of pledgable assets. This limit may arise because of the need of the firm’s
insiders to maintain at least a certain stake to mitigate moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997;
see also ch. 3 of Tirole 2006). Additional cash creates pledgable assets, and therefore increases
external financing capacity. This loosens the external financing constraint. A firm operating at its
debt capacity may therefore respond by taking on additional debt. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Sheifer (1994) find similar results in their study of 11 firms receiving lawsuit windfalls. My
results extend these findings to a large sample.
47
external capital. If accessing capital markets is costly, firms may retain additional
cash to reduce the likelihood of needing to access the capital market to finance
future investment. Such an argument is the motivation for Almeida, Campello
and Weisbach’s (2004) study of the cash flow sensitivity of cash. The dependent
variable in column 5 is the firm’s cash balance (item 1), scaled by beginning-of-
year assets. If firms retain cash as a buffer against future cash shortfalls, then the
coefficient on NOL tax savings should be positive, which it indeed is. The result
indicates that firms in the sample save, on average, $0.415 out of each additional
$1 of cash flow. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Taken as a whole, the results in table 2.6 do not support the predictions of a
perfect capital markets model that firms disgorge excess cash. If anything, firms
appear to retain additional cash and to generate positive financing flows in re-
sponse to additional cash flow. These findings are more consistent with capital
market imperfections constraining the ability of firms to raise external capital.
2.3.6 NOL tax savings and capital expenditures - robustness
Section 4.1 showed that capital expenditures respond to cash flow, using a
measure of cash flow that is purged of the influence of unobserved investment
opportunities. I now return to this result and present several tests designed to
ensure its robustness. The results of these tests appear in table 2.7. The depen-
dent variable in all of the tests is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year
assets.
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I begin by showing that the results are not driven by NOL tax savings cap-
turing information about marginal tax rates, which might themselves affect in-
vestment decisions. Tax loss carryforwards affect a firm’s marginal tax rate in
the current year and in future years. Controlling for beginning-of-year carryfor-
wards available and pro forma tax liability should account for the effect of loss
carryforwards on the current year marginal tax rate. To verify that the effect of
carryforwards on future marginal tax rates does not unduly influence my results, I
add end-of-year carryforwards remaining to the specification. The amount of tax
savings potentially affects future marginal tax rates only because it reduces carry-
forwards remaining at the end of the year. Thus end-of-year carryforwards are a
sufficient statistic for future marginal tax rates with respect to NOL tax savings.
The results of the augmented test are presented in column 1. The coefficient on
ending NOL carryforwards is statistically insignificant. The tax savings coefficient
actually increases in this specification to 0.855. Because NOL tax savings, carry-
forwards available, and ending carryforwards are highly collinear, the estimated
effect of NOL tax savings is much less precisely estimated in this specification.
The standard error of the NOL tax savings coefficient more than quadruples from
0.094 in column 3 of table 2.2 to 0.420. Nevertheless, this coefficient remains sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. The effect of NOL tax savings on marginal tax
rates does not appear to be driving the paper’s main result.
I now apply four filters and re-obtain the main result to ensure that the result is
not being driven by particular types of firms. One potential concern is that firms
have an incentive to manage their earnings in order to maximize the value of the
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net operating loss asset. For example, Maydew (1997) shows that firms shifted
revenues and expenses to increase tax loss carrybacks immediately after the 1986
Tax Reform Act (TRA). This allowed firms to generate tax savings at the higher
pre-TRA corporate tax rate instead of at the lower post-TRA rate. To reduce the
potential effects of earnings management, I calculate abnormal discretionary cur-
rent accruals using the approach of Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) and Teoh, Welch
and Wong (1998). I then remove observations in the top and bottom deciles of
discretionary accruals and re-run the capital expenditures regression. The results
when this filter is applied are presented in column 2. The coefficient on NOL tax
savings increases slightly to 0.371. Firms that engage in a high degree of earnings
management do not appear to be driving the results in the paper.44
Young, growing firms that have recently gone public often report significant
accounting losses. Those that survive are likely to begin generating profits when
they reach maturity. Not surprisingly, then, many of the firms in my sample that
are using tax loss carryforwards are relatively young firms. To ensure that these
firms alone are not driving the results, I exclude from the sample all observations
for firms listed in COMPUSTAT for five years or less and re-run the capital expen-
ditures regression. This reduces the number of observations to 32,917. The results
when this second filter is applied are shown in column 3. The coefficient on NOL
tax savings increases slightly to 0.398 and remains statistically significant at the
44Note that the number of observations decreases by more than 20% when this filter is applied
because of the first differencing.
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1% level. Thus the results are not driven by firms that have gone public in the
very recent past.
A related potential concern is that many of the loss carryforward firms in the
sample are small. For example, panel B of table 2.1 shows that the median loss
carryforward firm has total beginning-of-year assets (in 2005 dollars) of $76 mil-
lion while the median firm without carryforwards has total assets of $231 million.
To ensure that the results are not being driven by only small firms, I exclude all
observations for which beginning-of-year assets in 2005 dollars are less than $200
million and re-run the capital expenditures regression. This reduces the number
of observations to 21,984. The results when this third filter is applied are pre-
sented in column 4. The coefficient on NOL tax savings increases to 0.567 for this
subsample. Thus the results are not being driven by small firms.45
Finally, as discussed in the appendix, while COMPUSTAT tax data are the
primary source for most empirical corporate taxation research, there are known
issues with reliability of the data. To reduce the incidence of measurement er-
ror, I apply two filters. First differences regressions are then run on the resulting
samples. Measurement error in the COMPUSTAT NOL carryforward data can oc-
cur because the data capture all carryforwards, including foreign carryforwards,
instead of only U.S. federal income tax carryforwards. To obtain more accurate
NOL carryforward amounts, I remove from the sample all firms with positive
identifiable assets in a foreign or non-domestic segment using the COMPUSTAT
45The result continues to hold if the threshold for inclusion is increased to $1 billion instead. The
result also continues to hold if a minimum size threshold based on sales or employment is used.
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segments data. The results when this fourth filter is applied are presented in col-
umn 5. Removing firms with foreign segments increases the NOL tax savings
coefficient to 0.567, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, the way I calculate NOL tax savings may be a concern. The amount
of income offset by carryforwards in a given year is calculated as the decrease in
carryforwards from the beginning of the year to the end of the year. However, car-
ryforwards can also fall because they expire unused. This is a significant concern
before 1981, when carryforwards expired after only 5 years, which can cause NOL
tax savings to be mis-measured. To ensure that this does not overly influence my
results, I remove all pre-1981 observations for which the firm reported a positive
carryforward exactly 5 years before the observation.46 The results after this filter
is imposed are presented in column 6. The coefficient on NOL tax savings is 0.245
and remains statistically significant at the 5% level.
2.4 Conclusion
The impact of capital market imperfections on real firm behavior is one of the
most important issues in corporate finance. A commonly-investigated implica-
tion of capital market imperfections is the dependence of investment on internal
resources. However, estimation of this dependence is bedeviled by a problem of
omitted variables. This paper uses a feature of the tax code to shed new light
46Note that this approach is conservative. A firm that possessed carryforwards five years before
may have used these carryforwards to offset profits in some years and generated new carryfor-
wards through losses in others. These new carryforwards would be available to the firm and
would not expire in the current year.
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on this effect. Firms generate a real cash savings by using tax loss carryforwards
from prior periods to offset taxable income in the current period. Controlling for
the tax loss carryforwards a firm has available and the amount of tax it would
have paid in the absence of carryforwards enables me to identify the cash flow
effect of the savings. Estimating an empirical model based on this insight, I show
that investment of various forms increases with the cash flows available to the
firm. The impact of capital market conditions on the estimated investment-cash
flow sensitivity is shown to be in line with the notion that internal resources are
significantly cheaper than external resources.
Distributions, on the other hand, do not respond in a similar fashion, sug-
gesting that they are not merely the residual in a static investment optimization
problem. Firms also increase take advantage of the extra cash to increase cash
balances. The results of this paper indicate that capital market imperfections play
a significant role in shaping investment and financing decisions.
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2.5 Appendix: Discussion of COMPUSTAT tax data
Since the IRS has restrictions on the release of individual corporate income
tax returns data, studies focusing on the effects of corporate income taxes have
typically used tax data available through COMPUSTAT.47 This study relies on
two tax variables from COMPUSTAT - current federal income tax expense (item
63) and NOL carryforwards (item 52). I discuss what is known about each of these
variables in turn.
2.5.1 Issues with current federal tax expense
Corporate taxation studies typically use a firm’s current federal tax expense as
a proxy for federal tax liability. Dworin (1985) investigates the reasonableness of
current tax expense as a proxy for tax liability using confidential tax return data
for 1979-1981. He shows in general that current tax expense reported by COMPU-
STAT is 5% to 8% larger on average than income tax liability. The disparity is very
large for regulated utilities, which are not included in my sample. The disparity
also appears to be a significantly greater issue for smaller firms. In robustness
tests, I purge my sample of firms with less than $200 million of total assets at the
beginning of the year (in 2005 dollars) and show that the results hold (and in fact
become larger in magnitude) for this sample of larger firms.
47COMPUSTAT gathers tax data from firm financial statements. Much of the detailed data is
extracted from the footnotes to the financial statements.
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2.5.2 Issues with NOL carryforwards
COMPUSTAT NOL carryforward data has been used in numerous academic
studies (e.g. Mackie-Mason 1990, Shevlin 1990, Givoly, Hahn, Ofer, and Sarig
1992, Graham 1996a, 1996b, Auerbach and Poterba 1986). Mills, Newberry and
Novack (2003) use confidential firm-level U.S. federal tax return data to assess
the quality of COMPUSTAT NOL carryforward data. While they cannot observe
the actual NOL carryforwards a firm has available, they can observe whether or
not a firm uses carryforwards to offset income in a given year. This information
allows them to determine the frequency with which COMPUSTAT reports a pos-
itive NOL carryforward when none is actually available as well as the opposite
case. They find that COMPUSTAT reports a carryforward balance when no carry-
forward exists per the tax return 9.4% of the time, and that COMPUSTAT reports
no carryforward balance when a carryforward does exist per the tax return 3.3%
of the time.
COMPUSTAT item 52 may fail to accurately capture the NOL carryforwards
available for offsetting taxable income for at least three reasons. First, item 52
does not always capture carryforwards for tax purposes. Item 52 is populated
from the tax footnote of financial statements. This footnote may show carryfor-
wards for tax purposes, carryforwards for financial accounting purposes, or both.
If only NOL carryforwards for financial accounting purposes are provided, or if
both are provided, COMPUSTAT reports carryforwards for financial accounting
purposes. To the extent that only carryforwards for tax purposes have cash flow
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implications, differences in the amounts of NOL carryforwards for tax purposes
and NOL carryforwards for financial accounting purposes potentially create mea-
surement error in the tax-related variables used in this paper.48
The second relevant issue with COMPUSTAT NOL carryforward data is the
presence of coding errors. Kinney and Swanson (1993) report that, in a sample of
266 firm-years, there are 28 cases in which item 52 is missing but a carryforward
for tax purposes is reported in the tax footnote, and 5 cases in which item 52 is
populated but there is no carryforward at all reported in the tax footnote. Manzon
(1994) reports similar error rates. The presence of coding errors creates additional
noise which adds to the measurement error of any variables constructed using
item 52.
The third issue with COMPUSTAT NOL carryforward data is that the carryfor-
wards reported by firms in their tax footnotes, whether book or tax carryforwards,
can contain carryforwards not available for offsetting U.S. federal taxable income.
Multinational firms can generate carryforwards in foreign countries that cannot be
used to offset domestic income. In addition, after 1986, section 382 of the U.S. In-
ternal Revenue Code places restrictions on the amount of carryforwards obtained
through acquisitions that can be used to offset income in any particular year. Mills,
Newberry and Novack (2003) find that of 241 cases in which there is a COMPU-
STAT NOL carryforward but no tax return carryforward, foreign carryforwards
were disclosed in the tax footnote in 168 cases, and acquired carryforwards were
found in 23 cases.
48See Kinney and Swanson (1993).
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Mills, Newberry and Novack (2003) recommend considering firms to have car-
ryforwards only if COMPUSTAT reports a positive carryforward balance (item 52
> 0) and no U.S. current income tax (item 63 ≤ 0). This reduces the frequency
of cases in which an NOL carryforward is reported but no tax NOL exists from
9.4% to 1.5%. This restriction is imposed for inclusion in my sample. This filter
should remove cases in which a firm owns acquired NOLs subject to the section
382 limitation. For robustness, I also remove all firms reporting identifiable assets
in foreign segments and re-obtain the paper’s main results.
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Figure 2.1: Kink in the NOL tax savings function
Figure 2.1 depicts the kink in NOL tax savings as a function of pro forma tax liability, under the
assumption of a flat tax rate τ. Pro forma tax liability is the tax liability a firm would incur if it had
no tax loss carryforwards available. Actual tax liability is the amount tax liability the firm actually
incurs. NOL tax savings is the difference between pro forma and actual tax liability.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium mixed strategy probabilities
Figure 2.2a depicts the relationship between investment and profits under the assumption that tax-
related cash flows do not affect investment. The smooth nature of the investment curve at the point
at which profits equal carryforwards available (where carryforwards are exhausted) indicates that
investment does not respond to cash flow. Figure 2.2b depicts the relationship between investment
and profits under the assumption that tax-related cash flows do affect investment. The downward
kink in the investment curve at the point at which profits equal carryforwards available (where
carryforwards are exhausted) indicates that investment does respond to cash flow.
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Figure 2.3: Observations and tax savings by year
Figure 2.3 shows, for each year in the sample, the number of observations in the sample, the number
of observations in the sample with positive beginning-of-year carryforwards available, and the
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Figure 2.4: Capex residual and distance to kink
Figure 2.4 depicts the results of kernel regression. Capital expenditures are regressed using OLS
on carryforwards available, pre-tax cash flow, lagged Tobin’s Q, and firm and year dummies. The
dependent variable in the kernel regression is the residual from this OLS regression. The indepen-
dent variable is the distance to the kink in the tax function resulting from the availability of tax
loss carryforwards. This distance is defined as a firm’s pro forma tax liability less its tax savings
capacity. Pro forma tax liability is the tax liability a firm would incur if it had no tax loss carryfor-
wards available. Tax savings capacity is the maximum amount of tax a firm can avoid using tax
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary data for the sample studied in this paper. The sample consists of firm-year observations
during the period 1969-2005. See section 3.2 for a discussion of how the sample was constructed. Panel A summarizes the
distribution of the main variables used in the paper. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-year assets, except for Tobin’s
Q. Capital expenditures are COMPUSTAT item 128. Actual tax liability is item 63 (current federal income tax expense). NOL
carryforwards available is the lagged value of item 52. Total cash flow is net income (item 18) plus depreciation (item 14).
Pre-tax cash flow is total cash flow plus actual tax liability. Pro forma tax liability is computed by backing out taxable income
from actual tax liability using the federal corporate income tax schedule for the year in question, adding the amount of NOL
carryforwards used during the year (change in item 52), and then applying the federal corporate income tax schedule. NOL
tax savings are the difference between pro forma tax liability and actual tax liability. Tobin’s Q is the quotient of the market
and book values of a firm’s assets. Market value (the numerator) is book assets (item 6) plus the market value of equity (the
product of item 199 and item 25) minus book equity (item 60) minus deferred taxes (item 74). Book value (the denominator)
is book assets (item 6). Capital expenditures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Capital expenditures and Tobin’s
Q are winsorized at the 99th percentile. The other variables are trimmed at the 99th percentile (and 1st percentile for pre-tax
cash flow). Panel B compares the distributions for the subsample that have NOL carryforwards available at the beginning
of the year (“NOL Firms”) and the subsample that doesn’t (“Non-NOL Firms”).
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Whole Sample
Std. Percentile
Mean dev. Min 1st 25th 50th 75th 99th Max
Capital expenditures 0.090 0.084 0.000 0.003 0.036 0.066 0.114 0.467 0.467
Total cash flow 0.130 0.069 -0.221 -0.012 0.085 0.121 0.166 0.342 0.540
Pre-tax cash flow 0.174 0.098 -0.104 -0.006 0.106 0.158 0.226 0.474 0.570
NOL carryforwards available 0.018 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.559 1.358
Pro forma tax liability 0.046 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.037 0.064 0.174 0.228
NOL tax savings 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.228
Actual tax liability 0.044 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.035 0.063 0.171 0.228
Tobin’s Q 1.561 1.101 0.103 0.548 0.924 1.208 1.774 6.373 6.373
Panel B: NOL Firms and Non-NOL Firms
NOL Firms Non-NOL Firms
Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev.
Assets (millions of 2005 dollars) 479 76 2,655 2,112 231 11,964
Sales (millions of 2005 dollars) 564 94 2,434 2,379 368 9,373
No. of employees 2,923 575 10,614 11,487 2,190 35,953
Tobin’s Q 1.492 1.136 1.166 1.567 1.215 1.100
Net PPE/assets 0.321 0.257 0.232 0.328 0.293 0.199
Net book leverage 0.211 0.256 0.308 0.089 0.121 0.246
Capital expenditures 0.083 0.047 0.101 0.091 0.068 0.082
Total cash flow/assets 0.093 0.082 0.084 0.133 0.123 0.066
Pre-tax cash flow 0.105 0.088 0.099 0.180 0.163 0.095
NOL carryforwards available 0.237 0.120 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pro forma tax liability 0.036 0.023 0.039 0.047 0.038 0.038
NOL tax savings 0.024 0.012 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
Actual tax liability 0.012 0.000 0.026 0.047 0.038 0.038
Observations 3,749 48,333
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Table 2.2: Capital expenditures and NOL tax savings
This tables presents a series of regressions for an unbalanced panel of firms from 1969 through 2005. The dependent vari-
ables in each specification is capital expenditures. All explanatory variables except lagged Tobin’s Q are scaled by beginning-
of-year total assets as well. All regressions include year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level are reported below each point estimate. The first five columns present results from first differences regressions.
Of these, the first four are estimated using ordinary least squares, while the fifth is estimated using the method of Prais
and Winsten (1954) to account for first order autocorrelation. The sixth column presents results from a firm fixed effects
regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total cash flow 0.313***
(0.012)
Actual tax liability -0.632***
(0.041)
NOL tax savings 0.345*** 0.408*** 0.368*** 0.582***
(0.094) (0.099) (0.092) (0.098)
Pro forma tax liability -0.638*** -0.807*** -0.648*** -0.893***
(0.042) (0.071) (0.040) (0.046)
(Pro forma tax liability)2 2.455***
(0.840)
(Pro forma tax liability)3 -8.872***
(3.211)
Pre-tax cash flow 0.402*** 0.404*** 0.405*** 0.411*** 0.512***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
NOL carryforwards available 0.034 -0.069 0.023 -0.025
(0.035) (0.068) (0.034) (0.019)
(NOL carryforwards available)2 0.359**
(0.173)
(NOL carryforwards available)3 -0.257**
(0.110)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 38,442 38,442 38,442 38,442 38,442 46,442
Number of firms 5,573 5,573 5,573 5,573 5,573 5,573
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.606
***, ** and *: significant at 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively.
Superscripts denote exponents.
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Table 2.3: Other forms of investment and NOL tax savings
All regressions is this table are run in first differences and include year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported below each point estimate. The dependent variable in specification 1 is change in
working capital, which is working capital in year t less working capital in year t− 1. Working capital is defined as inventory
(COMPUSTAT item 3) + accounts receivable (item 2) - accounts payable (item 70). The dependent variables in specifications
2 through 5 respectively are acquisitions (item 129), advertising expense (item 45), rental expense (item 47), and research and
development (item 46). Research and development is assumed to be 0 if the value is missing in COMPUSTAT. All dependent
variables are scaled by beginning-of-year total assets and are winsorized at the 99th percentile (and the 1st percentile for
change in working capital).
(∆WC) (Acquisitions) (Advertising) (Rent) (R&D)
NOL tax savings 0.424** 0.227** 0.125** 0.077*** 0.023
(0.170) (0.116) (0.050) (0.022) (0.024)
Pro forma tax liability -0.673*** -0.451*** -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.011
(0.072) (0.062) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014)
NOL carryforwards available 0.104** 0.075** 0.012 0.012** 0.006
(0.052) (0.038) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Pre-tax cash flow 0.778*** 0.323*** 0.077*** 0.058*** 0.022***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 37,369 33,753 15,027 30,588 38,263
Number of firms 5,476 5,398 2,793 5,047 5,545
Adjusted R-squared 0.137 0.025 0.063 0.058 0.014
***, ** and *: significant at 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively.
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Table 2.4: Capital expenditures, NOL tax savings, and firm characteristics
The dependent variable in all specification is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year assets. All regressions is
this table are run in first differences and include year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm
level are reported below each point estimate. The explanatory variables in each specification are NOL tax savings, Pro forma
tax liability, NOL carryforwards available, and pre-tax cash flow, all scaled by beginning-of-year assets, and lagged Tobin’s
Q, as well as the interactions of each of these with an observation-specific proxy for severity of financing constraints. The
constraint proxy varies by column. The constraint proxies are the Kaplan-Zingales 4-variable index, the Whited and Wu
(2006) index, net debt (liabilities less cash) divided by assets, an indicator for whether the firm has a credit rating, and an
indicator for whether the firm paid dividends. All are measured at the beginning of the year. See the text for more details
about these variables. For brevity, only coefficients for NOL tax savings, the constraint proxies, and the interaction terms
are reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NOL tax savings 0.375*** 0.658*** 0.474*** 0.389*** 0.264***
(0.096) (0.186) (0.115) (0.097) (0.101)
Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index -0.011***
(0.001)
NOL tax savings × KZ 0.002
(0.082)
Whited-Wu (WW) index 0.040*
(0.022)












NOL tax savings × Idivpayer 0.151
(0.344)
Observations 36,838 37,265 38,166 38,442 38,442
Number of firms 5,436 5,480 5,539 5,573 5,573
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.092 0.137 0.093 0.092
***, ** and *: significant at 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively.
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Table 2.5: Capital expenditures, NOL tax savings, and capital market conditions
The dependent variable in each specification is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year assets. All regressions is
this table are run in first differences and include year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm
level are reported below each point estimate. The explanatory variables in each specification include NOL tax savings, pro
forma tax liability, NOL carryforwards available, and pre-tax cash flow, all scaled by beginning-of-year assets, and lagged
Tobin’s Q. Bond spread is the spread between the yields on Baa- and Aaa-rated bonds, as reported by Moody’s, less the
lowest value of the spread in the sample. Ihasrating is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm had a credit
rating at the end of the preceding year and a 0 otherwise. Inverse SEO intensity takes a value of 0 for observations in the 12
years in the sample with the most SEOs as reported by SDC, 2 for observations in the 12 years with the fewest SEOs, and 1
for the intermediate 13 years. ∆ GDP is the real GDP growth rate reported by NBER.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NOL tax savings -0.343 -0.319 0.163 -0.261 0.337*
(0.246) (0.247) (0.149) (0.283) (0.172)
Bond spread (BS) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NOL tax savings × BS 0.619*** 0.623*** 0.603***
(0.187) (0.188) (0.189)
NOL tax savings × BS × Ihasrating -1.369***
(0.509)
Inverse SEO intensity -0.004** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
NOL tax savings × Inv SEO int 0.166* 0.175**
(0.088) (0.087)
∆ GDP 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
NOL tax savings × ∆ GDP -1.718 -6.267**
(3.245) (3.040)
Observations 38,442 38,442 38,442 38,442 38,442
Number of firms 5,573 5,573 5,573 5,573 5,573
Adjusted R-squared 0.094 0.095 0.094 0.095 0.095
***, ** and *: significant at 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively.
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Table 2.6: Distributions to shareholders and NOL tax savings
All regressions is this table are run in first differences and include year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported below each point estimate. The dependent variable in specification 1 is common
dividends (COMPUSTAT item 21), scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The dependent variable in specification 2 is share
repurchases (item 115), scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The dependent variable in column 3 is equity issuance (item
108). The dependent variable in specification 4 is change in debt scaled by beginning of year assets, where debt is defined
as long-term debt (item 9) plus debt in current liabilities (item 34). The dependent variable in column 5 is change in cash
scaled by beginning of year assets, where cash is item 1.
(Div) (Repur) (Equity iss.) (∆Debt) (∆Cash)
NOL tax savings 0.011 -0.034 0.146 0.488** 0.415***
(0.012) (0.034) (0.131) (0.239) (0.158)
Pro forma tax liability -0.011** 0.040** -0.341*** -1.525*** -0.077
(0.005) (0.016) (0.060) (0.112) (0.083)
NOL carryforwards available -0.004 -0.001 0.089** 0.243*** 0.087*
(0.004) (0.009) (0.043) (0.080) (0.049)
Pre-tax cash flow 0.021*** -0.019** 0.386*** 0.836*** 0.496***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.027) (0.051) (0.037)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.000*** 0.001** 0.008*** 0.019*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 38,442 38,442 35,570 38,173 38,252
Number of firms 5,573 5,573 5,461 5,538 5,545
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.008 0.062 0.051 0.069
***, ** and *: significant at 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively.
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Table 2.7: Capital expenditures and NOL tax savings - robustness
The dependent variables in each specification is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. All specifi-
cations include year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported below each
point estimate. Specification 1 includes ending NOL carryforwards. Specification 2 is estimated in first differences using
the model of Prais and Winsten (1954) to control for AR(1). Filters are applied to the sample in specifications 2 through 5.
Observations with abnormal accruals, computed using the method of Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) and Teoh, Wong and
Rao (1998), in the lowest and highest deciles in the sample are excluded in specification 2. Observations for the first five
years a firm is reported in COMPUSTAT are excluded in specification 3. Observations with less than $200 million in total
assets (in 2005 dollars) are excluded in specification 4. Observations reporting a foreign or non-domestic segment in the
SEGMENTS data are excluded in specification 5. Observations prior to 1981 for which NOL carryforwards were greater
than 0 five years prior to the observation are excluded in specification 6.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NOL tax savings 0.855** 0.371*** 0.398*** 0.412** 0.567*** 0.245**
(0.420) (0.135) (0.102) (0.179) (0.110) (0.119)
Pro forma tax liability -0.639*** -0.619*** -0.646*** -0.679*** -0.781*** -0.605***
(0.042) (0.052) (0.046) (0.058) (0.060) (0.042)
Pre-tax cash flow 0.405*** 0.374*** 0.394*** 0.390*** 0.464*** 0.389***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018)
NOL carryforwards available -0.180 0.049 0.025 -0.017 0.002 0.030
(0.176) (0.052) (0.037) (0.050) (0.034) (0.046)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ending NOL carryforwards 0.217
(0.175)
Filter No large No Assets No No
abnormal recent ≥$200M foreign stale
accruals IPOs segments NOLs
Observations 38,442 26,271 32,917 20,575 21,984 36,970
Number of firms 5,573 4,593 4,570 2,659 3,606 5,427
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.070 0.086 0.105 0.087 0.090
***, ** and *: significant at 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively.
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Chapter III
Financial Fraud and Investment Efficiency
In a well-known paper, Myers and Majluf (1984) establish that cash-poor firms
may forgo positive NPV investments when asymmetric information about their
assets already in place creates adverse selection in the capital market. Their result
suggests that the financial accounting system can play a valuable economic role
by increasing the information content of reports capturing value-relevant infor-
mation about assets in place. One way it can do so is by making it more difficult
and/or costly for firms to inflate their performance reports. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 represents a recent legislative attempt to accomplish this. Preventing
firms from reporting inflated accounting results can alleviate the underinvestment
problem by reducing adverse selection in the capital market.
However, I show in this paper that curtailing performance inflation comes at a
cost if there are also informational asymmetries about firms’ investment opportu-
nity sets. When there is asymmetric information about investment opportunities,
firms with investments of differing quality are pooled in the capital market. As a
result, a firm with only negative NPV investments, finding its shares overvalued,
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may invest in its value-destroying projects in order to sell overpriced equity. This
inefficiency could be alleviated if a firm with better investments had a means of
signaling this information. A key result of this paper is that a firm may be able to
send such a signal by inflating its performance report, even though such a report
is in principle designed to capture only information about assets already in place.
The resulting separation reduces overvaluation and therefore overinvestment. As
a result, leaving firms some wiggle room in reporting through restrained audit-
ing requirements and temperate penalties for misreporting can actually enhance
value creation.
To understand the effects of financial reporting on investment decisions, I
build a simple asymmetric information model with costly state falsification. In
the model, a firm has assets in place and a single, indivisible investment project.
The firm’s management, which acts in the interest of current shareholders, pri-
vately observes the quality of both. A firm can have either a good (positive NPV)
project or a bad (negative NPV) project. The firm has no cash to finance its project
but can raise new capital to do so by issuing equity.1 Before issuing equity, the
firm is required to report publicly the quality of its assets in place.2 It can inflate
this report at a cost. The cost could take the form of prospective fines and penalties
for mis-reporting as well as a waste of resources to evade auditors.
Inflating its report benefits a firm’s current shareholders by reducing the share
of the firm that must be given to new investors in exchange for capital. A firm
1I also briefly consider the case of debt financing.
2One can think of this report as a prospectus, but it could also take the form of a regularly
scheduled financial accounting report.
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inflates its report if this benefit exceeds the cost. A key result of the paper is
that this benefit is greater for a firm with a good project, since the savings from
reducing the share of the firm that must be given to new investors increases with
expected firm value. Because of this gap, a firm with a good project may be able
to signal by inflating its report about its assets in place.3
Whether such signaling occurs in equilibrium depends on the cost of perfor-
mance inflation. If this cost is very high or very low, signaling fails, since it is too
costly in the former case and imitation is too cheap in the latter. In the absence
of signaling, firms with projects of differing quality are pooled in the capital mar-
ket. The result can be underinvestment by firms with negative NPV projects, as
in Myers and Majluf (1984), overinvestment by firms with negative NPV projects
that take advantage of their overpriced equity, or both.
If instead the cost of performance inflation is in a moderate range, signaling
does indeed occur in equilibrium. As a result, firms with bad projects are at least
partially separated out. Forced to internalize the cost of value-destroying invest-
ment, they refrain from investing. Therefore increasing the cost of performance
inflation beyond a moderate level actually reduces investment efficiency.4
A key assumption of the model is that firms are not permitted to simply report
the quality of their investment projects. If firms can credibly report such infor-
3I also briefly explore a second possible reason why a firm with a good investment project
might have an advantage in inflating its report. Since a firm that experiences high future cash flow
is less likely to have inflated information about its assets in place today, such a firm is less likely to
be investigated for reporting falsely. Since a firm with a good project is more likely to have high
future cash flow, it is less likely to be investigated and therefore finds inflating its report less costly.
4Note that this argument is very different from arguments for limited penalties in the optimal
law enforcement literature, which emphasize the cost of enforcement (see Garoupa 1997 for a
review) or the benefits of inducing the choice of less harmful crimes (Mookherjee and Png 1994).
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mation directly, then there is clearly no need to communicate it through a costly
signal. However, I argue that firms cannot realistically be held accountable for the
accuracy of such reports (or at least are unlikely to be so), robbing them of cred-
ibility. This highlights a key distinction between assets in place and investment
opportunities. The former generates ongoing, measurable information in the form
of profits and cash flows. Auditing practices and penalties for mis-reporting can
imbue reports of such information with credibility. As-of-yet-unpursued invest-
ment opportunities, on the other hand, do not generate measurable performance
metrics.
The inability of firms to credibly communicate direct information about their
investment opportunities creates a trade-off in reducing information asymmetries
about assets in place. Reducing these information asymmetries is potentially ben-
eficial because it makes reported information about assets in place more accurate.
However, it also reduces the potential of firms to signal the quality of their invest-
ment opportunities. Thus it makes reported information about assets in place less
informative about investment opportunities.5
It would be difficult to quantify based on the results of this paper optimal au-
diting policies and penalties for performance inflation for a real market regulator.
However, the results are still important because they suggest a downside to mak-
5Interestingly, Povel, Singh and Winton (2007) argue that if firms are motivated by financing
costs to report falsely, making disclosure more precise may actually lead to more inflated reports.
The reason is that greater precision causes investors to place greater weight on disclosures in form-
ing their posterior beliefs, increasing the incentives of firms to influence investor beliefs by disclos-
ing fraudulently. Their focus is on how the incentives of all firms to inflate reports vary with the
fraud penalty, while the focus of my paper is on how the effect of performance inflation costs
varies across firms with different investment opportunities.
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ing performance inflation more costly that has been overlooked. For example,
my analysis shows that an overlooked potential cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 is that it leaves insufficient wiggle room in financial reporting, resulting in
significant overinvestment.
Firms in my model inflate their performance reports in order to improve the
terms on which they can raise capital. There is a large body of evidence that firms
do, in fact, manipulate their earnings for this reason. For example, DuCharme
(1994), Friedlan (1994), and Shivakumar (2000) show that a firm’s accounting ac-
cruals tend to be abnormally high in periods immediately preceding securities
issuance. Accruals then tend to decrease immediately after securities issuance
(Rangan 1998 and Teoh, Wong and Rao 1998). These results are further supported
by the finding of DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2004) that accounting accruals
around the time of stock offers tend to be especially high for firms that are subse-
quently sued over their offers. Finally, there is evidence of a positive relationship
between a firm’s need for external financing and the likelihood of it being accused
of financial fraud (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995 and Erickson, Hanlon and
Maydew 2006).
In addition to improving the terms on which capital can be raised, other mo-
tives for performance inflation have been established. One established motive is
the ability of managers to profit from temporary overvaluation of their firms’ eq-
uity. A manager may over-report firm performance to inflate the firm’s stock price
because her compensation is tied directly to short-term performance (Goldman
and Slezak 2006, Hertzberg 2003, Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong 2006) or because
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she is able to profit by selling overvalued stock (Bar-Gill and Bebchuk 2003). Posi-
tive empirical relationships have been established between equity-based compen-
sation and financial fraud actions and prosecutions (Johnson, Ryan and Tian 2005;
Li 2005)6, earnings restatements (Burns and Kedia 2006) and accounting accruals
(Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). Accruals have also been linked to trading by
insiders (Beneish and Vargus 2002, Bergstresser and Philippon 2006).
A small set of papers argues, as I do, that performance manipulation may be in
the interest of a firm’s shareholders. Dye (1988) shows that current shareholders
benefit from performance inflation at the expense of prospective shareholders in
an overlapping generations model. Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) go a
step further by arguing that shareholders may want to give managers short-term
incentives in order to induce them to commit financial fraud so that shareholders
can sell their holdings at favorable prices. Finally, Arya, Glover and Sunder (1998)
argue that performance inflation by management overcomes limits to the ability
of shareholders to commit to an ex ante optimal firing policy. My model can easily
accommodate the possibility of decision-making by self-interested managers who
bear a personal cost if the firm is found to have reported fraudulently. In my
setting, a manager would benefit from the short-term effect on the stock price
only because it impacts the value of her claims in the long term.
Section 2 describes the model. The model is then analyzed in section 3. Section
4 concludes.
6However, Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2006) find no evidence of a relationship between
equity-based compensation and financial fraud.
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3.1 A model of investment and capital-raising under asymmetric
information
In this section, I describe a simple asymmetric information model featuring
disclosure, capital-raising and investment. A firm begins with assets in place and
access to a single, indivisible investment project that it can undertake in the future.
Undertaking this project requires a one-time, fixed capital outlay of K. However,
the firm lacks cash and the firm’s current shareholders are assumed to be either
unable or unwilling to finance further investment. So in order to invest in its
project, the firm must raise capital from outside investors. It can do so by issuing
new equity claims to outside investors, who form rational expectations and op-
erate in a perfectly competitive capital market.7 All agents in the model are risk
neutral. The firm’s management acts in the interests of its shareholders at any
point in time.
The quality of the firm’s assets in place is denoted p. Assets in place can be
either good (p = pG) or bad (p = pB). The quality of the firm’s investment project
is denoted q and can also be either good (q = qG) or bad (q = qB). Firms vary only
in the quality of their assets in place and projects. Thus a firm’s type can be fully
described by the pair (p, q), with four possible types: (pB, qB), (pB, qG), (pG, qB)
and (pG, qG). I denote by ρij ∈ (0, 1) for i, j ∈ {B, G} the unconditional probability
that a firm’s type is (pi, qj), with ∑i∈{B,G},j∈{B,G} ρij = 1. Management observes
the firm’s type, while outside investors know only the prior distribution of types.
7I briefly consider the case of debt financing in section 5.
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At some point in the future (I will make the timing clear shortly), the firm
generates a single cash flow. This cash flow can be either high (x = xH) or low
(x = xL). The quality of the firm’s assets in place and the quality of its project,
if this project is undertaken, together determine the distribution of the cash flow.
Specifically, the probability of a high cash flow is p + q if the firm has undertaken
its project and p if it has not. Thus the project serves to increase the probability
of a high cash flow.8 A firm with good assets in place is more likely to realize a
high cash flow than one with bad assets in place: pG > pB ≥ 0. Likewise, a good
project, if undertaken, increases the probability of a high cash flow more than a
bad project does: qG > qB ≥ 0. I assume that pG + qG ≤ 1 to keep the probability
of each of the two cash flows bounded between 0 and 1.
I denote the difference in the two possible cash flows as ∆x ≡ xH − xL. Let Rj
denote the expected gross rate of return on a project of quality qj, j ∈ {B, G}. The
expected return rate is Rj = qj∆x/K. The good project is assumed to create value:
RG > 1. The bad project, on the other hand, is assumed to destroy value: RB < 1.
Finally, I denote the expected cash flow of a firm of type (pi, qj), conditional on
investment in its project, as vij, with vij = xL + (pi + qj)∆x.
At time t = 0, the firm announces whether or not it will invest in its project.
I assume that this decision is irreversible. At time t = 1, a firm that intends to
raise capital must report the quality of its assets in place. It need not, however,
report this characteristic truthfully. I refer to this report as a performance report
8Other cash flow distributions yield similar results, but this simple binary distribution proves
the most parsimonious.
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since performance measures reflect the quality of a firm’s balance sheet. Letting
r ∈ {rB, rG} denote the report, the firm reports truthfully by reporting rB when
p = pB and by reporting rG when p = pG. The firm inflates its performance by
reporting rG when p = pB. Current shareholders bear a cost c if the firm inflates its
performance. This cost represents anticipated sanctions for mis-reporting as well
as resources, including managerial attention, that must be devoted to evading
auditor oversight. In principle the firm could also disclose information about its
investment project at this time. However, since this information can never be
verified, the firm cannot be punished for reporting it falsely. As a result, such
disclosure has no credibility and would be ignored.
At time t = 2, the firm can raise capital by issuing equity claims to outside
investors. The share of a firm reporting rk for k ∈ {B, G} that must be given to
outside investors in exchange for K units of capital is denoted 1 − αk. Current
shareholders retain the remaining proportion of shares αk. Since capital markets
are perfectly competitive, investors break even in expectation. Thus the expected
value of the share of the firm received by outside investors when a firm raises
capital must equal K. This requires that
(1− αk)E[x|rk] = K.
At time t = 3, the firm invests in its project if it announced its intention to do
so at t = 0. Finally, at time t = 4, the firm receives cash flow x and ceases to
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operate. This cash is apportioned to the firm’s original shareholders and its new
investors, if any, in accordance with their share of the firm’s equity.
3.1.1 Strategies and equilibrium definition
A firm makes two choices in the game: 1) whether or not to invest, and 2) if it
does decide to invest, whether to report that it has good or bad assets in place.9
A firm’s strategy is a probability distribution over three possible combinations
of investment and reporting decisions: 1) report rB and invest; 2) report rG and
invest; and 3) do not invest. Let σkij denote the probability that a firm of type
(pi, qj) reports rk and invests, with 0 ≤ σkij ≤ 1. The probability that a firm of type
(pi, qj) does not invest is simply 1− σBij − σGij .
In principle, there are eight mixed strategy probabilities to track: two for each
type of firm (one for each of the two possible reports about assets in place if the
firm invests). However, a firm has no incentive to under-report the quality of
its assets in place. So a firm with good assets in place never reports that it has
bad assets in place. That is, σBGj = 0 for j ∈ {B, G}. This leaves six remaining
probabilities that must be tracked.
Outside investors provide capital to finance investment. They do so on terms
that allow them to break even in equilibrium. Their beliefs about firms’ mixed
strategies establish the share of the firm (1− αB or 1− αG, depending on the firm’s
report) that they require in exchange for capital K. These beliefs must be correct
9The choice to raise capital is determined by the investment decisions and is therefore not an
independent choice.
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in equilibrium. The share of the firm that outside investors must receive to break











 = K, (3.1)
for k ∈ {B, G}. Thus the initial shareholders of a firm reporting rk and raising
capital retain a share of the firm,
αk = 1−
K
xL + [∑i∈{B,G} ∑j∈{B,G} ρijσkij(pi + qj)]∆x
. (3.2)
Finding an equilibrium involves identifying a set of mixed strategy probabilities
that are incentive compatible for firms and terms of raising capital that allow out-
side investors to break even in expectation, given firms’ strategies. The equilib-
rium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
3.2 Analysis of the model
In this section, I derive the equilibrium of the game described in section 2.
I focus on how the equilibrium and investment efficiency vary with the cost of




Since RG > 1 > RB, it is efficient for a firm to invest if and only if q = qG.
Reporting is important in the model because it affects investor perceptions of firm
value. This, in turn, affects the cost of raising capital in equilibrium and therefore
the payoff to the firm’s initial shareholders. However, a firm’s report does not
have any direct value consequences. It therefore does not impact the first best
outcome.
In terms of the notation, the first best outcome is achieved when σBBB = σ
G
BB =






BG = 1. The irrelevance of reporting in the first best
outcome is reflected in σBBG + σ
G
BG = 1. That is, whether a firm with bad assets in
place but a good investment project reports good or bad assets in place does not
matter, as long as it invests. I can now use this first best outcome as a benchmark
against which to assess the efficiency of any equilibrium. Before examining the
equilibrium, I make three technical assumptions that ensure that underinvestment
and overinvestment are both potential features of the equilibrium.
3.2.2 Underinvestment and overinvestment
To examine how investment efficiency varies with the cost of inflating per-
formance, the model needs to allow for the possibilities of underinvestment and
overinvestment. As Myers and Majluf (1984) show, when firms with assets in
place of differing quality are pooled, a firm with better assets in place may forgo
investment, even if investment would create value, rather than sell overpriced eq-
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uity. On the other hand, when firms with differing project quality are pooled, a
firm with a negative NPV investment may invest in order to sell overpriced equity.
I first make an assumption that ensures that underinvestment occurs in the
model when firms with similar projects but differing assets in place are pooled.
Assumption 1.
RG <
(xL + pG∆x)(ρBG + ρGG)
ρBGvBG + ρGGvGG − (ρBG + ρGG)K
. (3.3)
It can be shown that the expression on the right is greater than 1, so this as-
sumption does not conflict with the assumption that RG > 1. If RG is sufficiently
high, then a firm with a good project finds investment so rewarding that it is will-
ing to undertake it in spite of the cost that selling underpriced equity to finance it
imposes on current shareholders. Assumption 1 rules out this possibility, as I now
show formally.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (pB, qG) and (pG, qG) firms are pooled in the capital market. If
assumption 1 holds and (pB, qB) firms invest with probability 1, then (pG, qG) firms do
not invest.
While the appropriate assumption about RG ensures the possibility of under-
investment when firms with assets in place of differing quality are pooled, one
about RB ensures that overinvestment is possible when firms with projects of dif-
fering quality are pooled.






If RB is sufficiently low, then a firm with a bad project finds investing too costly,
even though investing allows the firm to sell overpriced equity. Assumption 2
rules out this possibility. Finally, it is useful for the purpose of examining compar-
ative statics to have a firm with a bad project invest with probability less than 1
when pooled with similar firms possessing good projects. The following assump-
tion ensures this possibility:
Assumption 3. For i ∈ {B, G},
RB <
(ρiB + ρiG)(xL + pi∆x)
ρiBviB + ρiGviG − (ρiB + ρiG)K
. (3.5)
The following lemma formally establishes that assumptions 2 and 3 are suffi-
cient for the desired mixing to occur when firms with projects of differing quality
are pooled.
Lemma 2. Suppose that, for i ∈ {B, G}, (pi, qB) and (pi, qG) firms are pooled in the
capital market (and pooled with no other type). If assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then a firm
with a bad project mixes between investing and not investing.
I assume going forward that assumptions 1 through 3 hold. I now analyze
equilibrium behavior. The character of the equilibrium depends on how costly
performance inflation is. Therefore, I examine equilibrium behavior for (three)
different ranges of c. I begin with the case when c is low, in which underinvest-
ment is likely to be a problem.
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3.2.3 Equilibrium when report inflation is cheap
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms may forgo positive NPV investments
when there is asymmetric information about assets already in place. In my model,
reporting with costly state falsification can reduce information asymmetries. How-
ever, if the cost of report inflation is small, then underinvestment is a feature of
my model as well.
To see why, suppose that report inflation is cheap (I will be precise about how
cheap it must be shortly) and that a (pG, qG) firm invests in equilibrium with prob-
ability 1. In this case, a (pB, qG) firm can improve the terms on which it raises capi-
tal by reporting rG and pooling with (pG, qG) firms. Since the cost is low, it does so
with probability 1. However, from lemma 2, this cannot be an equilibrium, since
a (pG, qG) strictly prefers not to invest when pooled with (pB, qG) firms. An equi-
librium in which a (pG, qG) firm mixes between investing and not investing is also
unsustainable, since the average value of firms in the pool is even lower when it
mixes than when it invests with probability 1, further exacerbating underpricing.
In fact, as I now show, a (pG, qG) firm never invests when c is sufficiently low.
Proposition 1. If c < cU, where
cU ≡
[
1− (ρBG + ρGG)vBG





then σGGG = 0.
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There are multiple possible equilibria when c < cU and the nature of these
depends on, among other things, the actual value of c. What proposition 1 shows
is that, when c is low, a (pG, qG) firm never invests in any equilibrium. The prob-
lem is that such a firm finds itself undervalued and hence is reluctant to issue
stock to finance investment. As c increases, the cost to a firm with pB assets in
place of reporting rG increases. As such a firm reports rG with lower probability
in response, underpricing of a (pG, qG) firm lessens. The threshold cU is the low-
est c at which equilibrium underpricing is mild enough that a (pG, qG) firm finds
investing worthwhile.
The key implication of proposition 1 is that if the cost of performance inflation
is sufficiently low, then the economy is plagued by underinvestment. This sug-
gests a role for the accounting system in making report inflation difficult - that
is, establishing policies that make c large. I investigate this further by examining
how the equilibrium changes when c increases above cU.
3.2.4 Equilibrium when report inflation cost is moderate
I now show that increasing c from a level below cU to a level above cU elim-
inates the underinvestment problem. To do so, I need to derive the equilibrium
for a range of possible c’s greater than cU. To build intuition for the equilibrium, I
first explore the incentives of a firm with bad assets in place to inflate its report.
Consider a firm with bad assets in place. Reporting rG benefits the firm’s cur-
rent shareholders by reducing the share of the firm that must be given to outside
investors in exchange for new capital. The cost of reporting rG when p = pB is
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simply c. The net benefit, which is negative if c is large enough, of reporting rG
instead of rB is the difference between the benefit and the cost:
(αG − αB)[xL + (pB + q)∆x]− c. (3.7)
Assuming that αG > αB, as must be true in equilibrium, (3.7) is greater if q = qG
than if q = qB. The benefit of reducing the share of the firm that must be given to
outside investors is greater when the expected value of the firm is greater. Since
the firm’s expected cash flow, and therefore its expected value, is greater when
q = qG, the net benefit of falsely reporting rG is greater when the firm has a good
project. The next proposition follows directly.
Proposition 2. If σGBB > 0, then σ
G
BG = 1. If σ
G
BG < 1, then σ
G
BB = 0.
This result suggests that (pB, qG) firms may be able to at least partially separate
from (pB, qB) firms and to pool with (pG, qG) firms by reporting rG. As I now show,
when c > cU, the cost to a (pB, qG) firm of reporting rG is high enough that σGBG < 1.
From proposition 2, σGBB = 0 when σ
G


















(ρGG + ρGBσGGB + ρBGσ
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BG)K





If a (pB, qB) firm mixes between investing and not investing, then its payoff from
the two actions must be equal:
αBvBB = xL + pB∆x. (3.10)










Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that σBBB ∈ (0, 1). Because σBBB is a linear function of
σBBG, and αB is determined by the proportion of the two types that report rB and in-
vest, αB does not change with σBBG in equilibrium. This pins down the equilibrium
value of αB, which can be found by substituting (3.11) into (3.8), which yields
αB =
xL + pB∆x
xL + (pB + qB)∆x
. (3.12)
A (pB, qG) firm, which always invests, mixes between reporting truthfully and
inflating its report only if it is indifferent between the two - that is, if
(αG − αB)vBG = c. (3.13)
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A (pG, qB) type firm, which always reports truthfully, mixes between investing
and not investing only if it likewise indifferent:
αGvGB = xL + pG∆x. (3.14)
But αG cannot, in general, satisfy both (3.13) and (3.14) simultaneously. Therefore
only one of the types (pB, qG) and (pG, qB) plays a mixed strategy in equilibrium.
Assumption 1 ensures that it is the (pB, qG) firm that plays a mixed strategy, while
a (pG, qB) firm never invests. Thus σGBG can be found by setting σ
G
GB = 0 in (3.9),
substituting (3.9) and (3.12) into (3.13), and solving. This yields
σGBG =
(pB + qG)(RBvGG − vBB)K− vBBvGGc
(pB + qG)(RBvBG − vBB)K− vBBvBGc
. (3.15)
The resulting mixed strategy equilibrium holds as long as c is not too large. If c
is large enough, then even a (pB, qG) firm finds it too costly to report rG, and so
σGBG = 0. The following proposition describes the equilibrium and defines the
range over which it holds:
Proposition 3. If cU < c < cT, where cU is as in (??) and
cT ≡ [(pG − pB)∆x](KRB)vBG
vBBvGB
, (3.16)
then σGGG = 1, σ
G
GB = 1, σ
B
BB = 0, σ
G
BG is given by (3.15), with σ
B
BG = 1− σGBG, and σBBB
is given by (3.11).
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The threshold cT is the lowest c for which all firms report truthfully in equi-
librium, as I show shortly. Proposition 3 shows that an increase in the cost of
performance inflation from below to above cU does, as anticipated, mitigate the
underinvestment problem by making reports more accurate, since σGGG = 1.
10
Thus making report inflation more costly can deliver an improvement in invest-
ment efficiency. As I show now, however, further increases in c beyond cU degrade
investment efficiency by increasing overinvestment.
Proposition 4. For c ∈ (cU, cT), investment in qB projects increases with c.
This result follows directly from (3.11) and (3.15). As c increases above cU,
inflating performance becomes more costly. As a result, a (pB, qG) firm reports
rG with lower probability. It therefore reports rB with greater probability. This
increases the potential for a (pB, qB) firm to take advantage of overpricing by in-
vesting. It therefore invests with greater probability. Since investing in the bad
project destroys value, overinvestment increases as c increases. This is true as
long as c < cT. I next consider what happens when c > cT.
3.2.5 Equilibrium when report inflation is expensive
If the cost of inflating reports is sufficiently high, then all firms report the qual-
ity of their assets in place truthfully with probability 1. Firms with assets in place
of the same quality but investment projects of differing quality are pooled in the
capital market. A firm with a good project invests with probability 1, while one
10While overinvestment occurs in this equilibrium, overinvestment also occurs in some of the
equilibria that exist when c < cU as well.
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with a bad project mixes between investing and not investing. Mixing requires
that the payoff to investing and not investing be equal for each pi:
αiviB = xL + pi∆x. (3.17)
The fraction αi of the firm retained by current shareholders when the firm raises
capital is determined by outside investors’ beliefs about the probability that a firm
with a bad project invests. These beliefs must be correct in equilibrium since out-















for i ∈ {B, G}. The solution is found by substituting (3.18) into (3.17) for each pi,
and then solving for σiiB.










for i ∈ {B, G}.
When all firms report truthfully in equilibrium, a firm with a good project in-
vests with probability 1 and one with a bad project invests with probability given
by (3.19). However, when c > cT, not only do (pB, qB) firms invest in their nega-
tive NPV projects, but so do (pG, qB) firms. They do so because, when firms report
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truthfully, (pB, qG) firms are excluded from the set of firms reporting rG. The re-
sulting increase in the expected value of firms in the pool raises αG and hence
makes investment attractive to (pG, qB) firms since they can sell overpriced equity.
Thus c > cT results in substantial overinvestment by two types of firm.
3.2.6 Investment efficiency and the cost of performance inflation
Having now examined equilibrium behavior for all possible values of c, I next
examine how investment efficiency varies with c. While the multiplicity of pos-
sible equilibria when c < cU makes it difficult to compare investment efficiency
between the c < cU and cU < c < cT cases, the relationship between investment
efficiency and c when c > cU is straightforward.
Proposition 6. For c > cU, investment efficiency decreases in c. Investment efficiency
does not vary with c when c > cT.
To better understand proposition 6, observe figure 1. This figure depicts the
relationship between equilibrium strategies and c for c > cU. Starting on the
right, when c > cT, both (pB, qB) and (pG, qB) firms invest in their negative NPV
projects with positive probability. For c > cT, a decrease in c does not affect the
equilibrium. When c falls just below cT, two things happen which both reduce
overinvestment and hence improve efficiency. First, (pB, qG) firms begin to re-
port rG with positive probability. The resulting degradation of the pool of firms
reporting rG drives out (pG, qB) firms, which no longer find it optimal to invest.
Second, since (pB, qG) firms report rB less often, the ability of (pB, qB) firms to sell
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overpriced equity by pooling with these firms falls, and they invest with lower
probability.
As c continues to fall below cT, (pB, qG) firms report rG with higher probability.
This further diminishes the ability of (pB, qB) firms to sell overpriced equity, and
they therefore invest less often. Thus investment efficiency continues to rise as
c falls, at least until c reaches cU. A moderate (rather than high) c is desirable
because it provides flexibility for firms with good projects to signal by reporting
rG, which in turn reduces overpricing of firms with bad projects. So if a regulator
can determine the cost of performance inflation through policy choices, it should
set the cost low enough to permit some flexibility for firms to inflate performance.
3.2.7 Conditional investigation or penalty
A final consideration is the possibility that the cost of inflating performance
depends on the firm’s ultimate cash flow realization. I have thus far assumed that
c, the cost of inflating performance, does not depend on this cash flow realization.
While this keeps the analysis simple, one might imagine that the cost would in-
deed be state-varying. For example, since a firm with bad assets in place is more
likely to experience the low cash flow than one with good assets in place, a market
regulator might optimally investigate reporting accuracy more often when a firm
receives a low cash flow after reporting good assets in place.
In this case, the expected cost of performance inflation would vary by the cash
flow realization. Let cL denote the cost when cash flow is low, and cH be similarly
defined for high cash flow. More frequent investigation when cash flow is low
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implies cL > cH. The net benefit of performance inflation becomes
(αG − αB)[xL + (pB + q)∆x]− [(pB + q)cH + (1− pB − q)cL]. (3.20)
I have already shown that a firm with a good investment project has an advantage
in inflating its performance report. This advantage makes signaling the quality of
its investment project feasible if the penalty for performance inflation is neither
too high nor too low. When cL > cH, a firm with a good investment project actu-
ally has two distinct advantages in inflating its performance report. Not only does
improving the terms on which capital can be raised benefit such a firm more, but
it also faces a lower cost since it is less likely to experience a low cash flow. Thus
allowing for the possibility of a conditional cost strengthens the paper’s results.
3.3 Conclusion
Conventional wisdom holds that performance inflation is inherently damag-
ing to a financial economy. I have shown that this need not be the case. Firms
can signal the quality of their investment opportunities by fraudulently inflat-
ing disclosures about variables driven by assets in place. Such signaling reduces
overinvestment. While increasing the cost of inflating performance reduces un-
derinvestment when this cost is low, it increases overinvestment when the cost is
higher. Therefore, policies that reduce misreporting can also reduce investment
efficiency.
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3.4 Appendix. Proofs of lemmas and propositions
3.4.1 Proof of lemma 1
Suppose to the contrary that (pG, qG) firms do invest with positive probability
when assumption 1 holds. Then it must be that





(xL + pG∆x)(1− αG), (3.21)






Note that this would be an equality if (pG, qG) firms invest with probability 1, but
is an inequality if they invest with probability less than 1. Substituting (3.22) into
(3.21) yields
RG ≥
(xL + pG∆x)(ρBG + ρGG)
ρBGvBG + ρGGvGG − (ρBG + ρGG)K
,
which contradicts assumption 1.
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3.4.2 Proof of lemma 2
A (pi, qB) firm invests with positive probability if






















Substituting (3.26) into (3.25) yields (3.5).
3.4.3 Proof of proposition 1
I first show that σGGG = 1 is impossible when c < c
U. Suppose that c < cU and
σGGG = 1. Lemma 2 rules out the possibility that σ
G
GB = 0 and σ
G
BG = 0. Suppose
that σGGB ∈ (0, 1) and σGBG = 0. Then σGGB is determined by (3.19). For σGBG = 0, it
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must be the case that










− xL + pB∆x
vBB
)vBG < c,
which contradicts c < cU. Now suppose that σGGB ∈ (0, 1) and σGBG ∈ (0, 1). This
possibility is ruled out in the proof of proposition 3. Finally, suppose that σGGB = 0
and σGBG ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that σGGG = 1. This requires that
αGvGG ≥ xL + pG∆x. (3.27)
For a (pB, qG) firm to be indifferent between reporting rB and rG, it must be the
case that
















(xL + pG∆x). (3.31)
For the equilibrium to be possible, the expression in (3.31) must be less than the





this requirement can be written as c > cU. Thus σGGG = 1 is impossible. Now
suppose that there is an equilibrium with σGGG ∈ (0, 1). Then there must also be
an equilibrium in which σGGG = 1 since αG is increasing in σ
G
GG. Since no such
equilibrium exists, there cannot be an equilibrium in which σGGG ∈ (0, 1). 
3.4.4 Proof of proposition 2
Suppose that σGBB > 0. This requires that
(αG − αB)vBB ≥ c
Since vBG > vBB,
(αG − αB)vBG > c.
So σGBG = 1. That σ
G
BG < 1 implies σ
G
BB = 0 follows from the contrapositive argu-
ment.
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3.4.5 Proof of proposition 3
Suppose that the equilibrium is as proposed. For σBBB ∈ (0, 1) as given by (3.11)
to hold, we must have
αBvBB = xL + pB∆x. (3.33)
Substituting from (3.12) into this expression shows that the equality holds. For
σGBB = 0, we must have
xL + pB∆x > αGvBB − c. (3.34)
Substituting from (3.9) shows that this holds. Consider now a (pB, qB) firm. For
σGGB = to hold, we must have
xL + pG∆x > αGvGB. (3.35)
Substituting from (3.9) shows that this holds. Consider now a (pG, qG) firm. For
σGGG to hold, we must have
αGvGG ≥ xL + pG∆x. (3.36)
Substituting from (3.9) shows that this holds as long as c > cU. Finally, consider a
(pB, qG) firm. For σBBG ∈ (0, 1), with σBBG = 1− σGBG, where σGBG is given by (3.15),
to hold, we must have
αBvBG > xL + pB∆x. (3.37)
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Substituting from (3.12) shows that this holds. Finally, for σGBG given by (3.15) to
hold, we must have
(αG − αB)vBG = c. (3.38)
Substituting from (3.12) and (3.9) shows that this holds for c < cT. 
3.4.6 Proof of proposition 5
Suppose that the equilibrium holds. For σGiG = 1, we must have
αiviG > xL + pi∆x (3.39)





Substituting from (3.40) into (3.39) results in viG/viB > 1, which must hold. For
σiiB ∈ (0, 1) given by (3.19), we must have
αiviB = xL + pB∆x. (3.41)
Substituting σiiB from (3.19) into (3.18) yields (3.40). This is the value of αi that
solves (3.41). Finally, for σGBG = 0, we must have
(αG − αB)vBG < c. (3.42)
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Substituting (3.40) in shows that this expression is true if c > cU. By proposition
2, σGBB = 0 must also hold. 
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium mixed strategy probabilities





















Temporal Structure of Executive Compensation
Aligning manager and shareholder interests through the grant of managerial
equity stakes reduces moral hazard costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Harris and
Raviv 1978, Holmstrom 1979, Shavell 1979, Jensen 1986). However, aligning in-
centives this way also carries a cost: Undiversified managers whose fortunes are
tied to firm value are forced to bear a substantial amount of risk. Such risk would
predispose a risk-averse manager to choose less risky projects than what other,
better diversified shareholders might prefer (Treynor and Black 1976, Amihud and
Lev 1981, May 1995). These arguments apply with even greater force to owner-
managers who own significant stakes in their companies. While outside share-
holders may benefit from such holdings in terms of alignment of incentives, they
may also suffer from the manager passing up positive NPV projects simply due
to the risk they entail.
Companies run by managers who already own significant stakes in their firms
often reward them with stock price-based bonuses as well as stock and option
grants that vest immediately or in the very near future. It is unlikely that such
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grants are intended to align managerial interests even more with those of long-
term shareholders, since such awards can be locked in or consumed in the short-
run. In addition, if such grants are not liquidated or hedged, they also increase the
manager’s exposure to undiversified, firm-specific risk. Besides, rewarding her
on short-term stock price performance may very well also give her incentives to
engage in stock price manipulation and divert her attention from long-term value
maximization. Such grants, therefore, have been seen in the literature as attempts
by managers to appropriate resources from outside shareholders (Bebchuk and
Fried 2003, 2004). In this paper, we seek to examine in greater detail the incentive
and risk effects of short-term equity-based compensation.
We argue in this paper that, unlike long-term shareholdings, short-term stock
price-based compensation may actually attenuate a manager’s bias against taking
on riskier projects. Thus, short-term stock-based compensation could be a crucial
ingredient in ensuring a better alignment of managerial and shareholder inter-
ests. The role of the market reaction to managerial choice is crucial in our analysis
since market prices will react positively to the choice of value-increasing risky
projects. Thus, making managerial compensation contingent on short-term stock
price movements may make it possible to induce greater risk-taking without si-
multaneously diluting managerial incentives to maximize long-term shareholder
value by avoiding risky projects. Thus, we establish another route through which
making managerial compensation dependent on stock price performance can lead
to greater value generation.
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To explore the role of the temporal aspect of compensation, we analyze a very
simple investment model. A risk-averse manager, endowed with a long-term eq-
uity stake in a firm, has to choose the level of riskiness of a project to undertake.
The expected payoffs to projects are assumed to increase with the level of risk un-
dertaken, up to a point. While the level of riskiness of the project undertaken by
the manager is observable, it is assumed to be non-contractible. In this context, we
first confirm that a larger long-term equity stake makes a risk-averse manager take
on lower levels of risk. This, in turn, compromises her mission of generating the
maximum value for her risk-neutral outside shareholders. Because she chooses
too little risk in equilibrium, an increase in risk increases the expected long-term
value of the firm. Since the stock market forms prices rationally, this, in turn, in-
creases the short-term stock price. Linking the manager’s pay to short-term stock
price therefore increases her incentive to take risk, leading to a more efficient risk
choice. However, the manager continues to choose less than the first best level of
risk, no matter how strong short-term incentives are.
We then show that the optimal managerial contract contains both short- and
long-term incentives. In our simple model, long-term incentives are needed to
reduce inefficient private benefits consumption by the firm’s manager. Given the
long-term incentives in the contract, it is optimal to include short-term incentives
as well to improve the manager’s risk-taking behavior. The less efficient the stock
market, the lower the optimal strength of short-term incentives. As stock market
efficiency falls, the noise in the short-term stock price increases. This increases the
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cost of providing short-term incentives, as these expose the manager to greater
risk.
We then relax the assumption that the risk-reward tradeoff of projects avail-
able to the manager is common knowledge. Thus, the manager gets to privately
observe the return to risk, and chooses a risk level conditional on this relationship.
This private information cannot be credibly communicated to the financial mar-
kets. However, financial markets can observe the risk characteristics of the project
she chooses. As before, such information cannot be contracted on directly. A long-
term stake in the project payoff, again, introduces bias into the process of manage-
rial project selection: all else equal, the manager prefers to choose a project with
lower risk. However, the information asymmetry magnifies the effect of short-
term incentives on risk-taking. The stock market reacts positively to risk not only
because the marginal return to risk is positive, but also because higher risk signals
that the return to risk is greater. Sufficiently strong short-term incentives in this
case can actually lead managers to attempt to influence short-term valuations by
taking excessive risk, reducing long-term value in the process.
Our analysis sheds some light on the widely noted empirical refutations of one
of the main predictions in the moral hazard model of Holmstrom (1979). In the
standard analysis of moral hazard, the principal tradeoff is between incentives
and risk. As a result, a higher managerial equity stake is optimal only when the
risk associated with revenues is lower. Yet, studies in fields as diverse as franchis-
ing, enterpreneurship and managerial compensation have found that the use of
revenue sharing and equity compensation is much more prevalent in riskier envi-
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ronments. While models based on asymmetric information have been constructed
to explain these puzzling empirical findings (Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya 1995,
Pendergast 2002), the analysis to date has ignored the role of the temporal distri-
bution of such incentives. Our analysis points out that, even in a relatively stan-
dard moral hazard context, it may be possible for managerial stake and risk to be
positively related, as long as the managerial stake is not restricted to be entirely
long-term in nature. As a result, our analysis suggests that allowing managers to
liquidate or to hedge away a part of their equity-based risks may be an integral
part of optimal managerial compensation.
Our analysis has major implications for risk choices undertaken by managers
in a wide variety of contexts. For example, while Amihud and Lev (1981) argue
that managers with greater equity stakes should exhibit a bias towards diversifica-
tion, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) find that managers with greater equity-based
compensation are not more likely to engage in diversification. As we show in this
paper, managerial incentives to diversify depend critically on the temporal nature
of the manager’s equity-based compensation. If the manager stands to benefit in
the short-run from such movements in stock prices, then the extent of her bias
toward diversification can be significantly attenuated. Thus, a proper test of the
diversification incentives of managers needs to take into account the temporal
distribution of managerial incentives.
Our analysis of the asymmetric information setting is related to the analysis of
fund manager compensation in Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2007). In their paper,
they show that when a fund manager’s trading activity is not directly observable,
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it is optimal for long-term shareholders to offer compensation to fund managers
based on short-term performance. While our analysis shares similar intuitions,
we focus explicitly on the tradeoffs between short- and long-term incentives. In
particular, we are able to focus on the relative merits of short-term stock-based
compensation for managers with differential equity holdings in the companies
they run.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of
managerial investment. In this section, we analyze the effect of short- and long-
term incentives on risk-taking, derive results regarding the optimal managerial
contract, and examine the effect of introducing asymmetric information regarding
the return to risk. Section 3 presents an application of our model to the issue of
corporate diversification. Section 4 concludes.
4.1 A model of managerial risk choice
We build a very simple stylized model of investment to illustrate how short-
term incentives affect a manager’s choice of risky projects to undertake. The key
feature of the model is a deterministic relationship between risk and expected
payoff. Linking managerial compensation to firm value is beneficial because it
reduces wasteful private benefits consumption. However, as a consequence of
such incentives and managerial risk aversion, the shareholders’ optimal level of
risk may not be implemented.
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4.1.1 Description of the model
Consider the case of a publicly-traded, all-equity firm managed by a single
risk-averse manager. The shareholders of the firm are comprised of the manager
and a set of risk-neutral outside investors. The stock price at any point in time
is determined rationally by the beliefs of the outside investors. Denote by v the
firm’s terminal value. No dividends are paid in this model and the risk-free rate
is normalized to zero. As a result, the value of the firm at any point of time is the
expected terminal value of the firm. Letting Ωt denote outside investors’ informa-
tion set at time t, the stock price is pt = E[v|Ωt].
The manager is assumed to have a mean-variance utility over terminal wealth
ξ,
EU(ξ) = E[ξ]− 1
2
r var(ξ), (4.1)
where r is a coefficient of risk aversion. The manager begins with 0 wealth and her
incremental wealth is the sum of compensation w and the value B of any private
benefits that she consumes. Thus the manager’s terminal wealth is ξ = w + B. The
manager does not face a wealth constraint and has reservation expected utility Ū.
The manager makes two decisions. The first decision is a choice of project
in which to invest. The manager chooses one project from among a continuum of
projects with variance σ2x ∈ [0, ∞] and mean µ(σ2x). The expected payoff is increas-
ing in the risk of the project up to a point, but at a decreasing rate, and decreasing
in risk beyond that point. In terms of notation, we have µ′ > 0 for σ2x < σ̂2x , µ′ = 0
for σ2x = σ̂2x , µ′ < 0 for σ2x > σ̂2x , µ′(0) = ∞, and µ′′ < 0. We assume initially
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that the mapping of risk to expected payoff µ is known by both management and
outside shareholders. We later examine the effect of asymmetric information by
making this relationship the private information of the firm’s management.
The second choice the manager makes is the level of private benefits B to con-
sume. Private benefit consumption reduces the value from the project payoff x to
a level of v = x− φ(B). Private benefit consumption is assumed to be inefficient
and this is captured by our assumptions that φ′ ≥ 1 ,φ′(0) = 1, 0 < φ′′ < ∞, and
φ(0) = 0. We assume that the noise in the realized payoffs makes forcing contracts
infeasible and, therefore, that managers can consume private benefits.
There are three dates. The manager begins at t = 0 with a compensation con-
tract in place. This compensation contract is initially taken as exogenously given,
though in subsequent analysis we investigate the issue of its optimality. At t = 1,
the manager chooses a project. Project choice is observable, and the stock price
updates accordingly to p. At t = 2, the manager consumes private benefits B
and project payoff x is realized, and the manager is paid in accordance with her
contract.
The manager’s possible compensation contract is assumed to be of the form
of a triple (α, β1, β2). The first term is a fixed wage component, the second the
weighting on the t = 1 stock price p, and the third the weighting on the terminal
value v. Thus the manager’s realized compensation is
w = α + β1p + β2v. (4.2)
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4.1.2 First best outcome
We begin by establishing the first best choice of project and private benefits
consumption as a benchmark. By assumption, expected project payoff µ increases
with project variance σ2x up to the point σ̂2x and then decreases subsequently. Thus
the first best project has payoff variance σ̂2x . Since the marginal cost of private ben-
efits consumed, φ′(B), is greater than 1 for all B, no private benefits are consumed
in the first best outcome. The following lemma captures the first best:
Lemma 3. In the first-best, project variance is chosen to maximize expected project payoff
(σ2x = σ̂2x) and no private benefits are consumed (B = 0).
Private benefits consumption is inefficient. However, a manager whose pay
is not closely-linked to the value of the firm fails to internalize this inefficiency
and does indeed consume private benefits. This moral hazard problem can be
addressed by linking the manager’s pay to the firm’s terminal value. However,
such long-term incentives expose the risk averse manager to undiversified risk,
which potentially distorts her project choice. We investigate the effect of long-
term incentives now.
4.1.3 Effect of long-term incentives
We analyze here the effect of the long-term incentive (β2) on the manager’s
private benefits consumption and investment decisions in the absence of short-
term incentives (that is, β1 = 0). For now, we assume that the manager suffers
from no wealth constraints so that her maximization problem coincides with the
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maximization of total surplus 1 The manager’s optimization problem is, then,
max
B,σ2x






















Since φ′′ < 0, private benefits consumption is decreasing in the manager’s stake
in the firm. This is not surprising, as increasing the manager’s stake forces her to
internalize more of the cost of private benefits consumption. As µ′′ < 0, the riski-
ness of the project chosen by the manager decreases in the manager’s stake in the
firm. This is also not surprising, as an increase in the manager’s stake increases
her exposure to the risk of terminal cash flows. Because she is risk-averse, the
manager chooses a project risk level lower than that preferred by her risk-neutral
outside shareholders. Increasing long-term incentives therefore diminishes the
1We explore the issue of optimal managerial contracts in the presence of managerial wealth
constraints via a numerical example later on in the paper. A full analysis of the problem with
managerial wealth constraints is left for a later version of the paper.
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manager’s moral hazard with respect to private benefits consumption, but inten-
sifies her moral hazard with respect to project risk choice.
4.1.4 Effect of short-term incentives
As has long been understood, and as we have just shown formally, long-term
incentives tend to mute risk-taking. What, then, about short-term incentives? By
definition, the long-term component of the manager’s wage is sensitive to the re-
alization of terminal cash flows. The short-term component, however, exposes the
manager to variations in the stock price due to changes in market expectations of
final cash flows. With short-term compensation, the manager’s problem becomes
max
B,σ2x






Note that the manager, in her optimization decision, takes the market price to be
a function solely of the choices observed by the market. The t = 1 stock price p
is affected by the manager’s equilibrium level of private benefits consumption B̂,
where this is correctly conjectured by investors. However, the manager’s choice
of B is not observed by the stock market at t = 1. Therefore the t = 1 stock price
p is not affected by the manager’s actual private benefits consumption decision.
As a result, the first order condition with respect to the choice of private benefit
levels remains the same as in our earlier derivation. As we now show, long-term
incentives continue to dampen the risk chosen after short-term incentives are in-
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troduced. However, short-term incentives themselves have the opposite effect on
risk choice.
Proposition 7. The manager’s choice of risk decreases in the strength of long-term incen-
tives and increases in the strength of short-term incentives.







rβ22 = 0 (4.8)
The t = 1 stock price is given by



















which is negative for all β2 because µ′′ < 0. Totally differentiating the first order








which is positive for all β1 because µ′′ < 0. 
The intuition behind the effect of long-term incentives on risk-taking remains
the same. More long-term incentives means greater exposure to project payoffs,
which induces the risk averse manager to choose less risky projects. The intuition
behind the effect of short-term incentives on risk-taking is simple in this context.
If the manager is exposed to the short-term stock price, she has an incentive to
increase the the stock price. The way to do this is to select a project with a higher
level of risk. This gives the manager an incentive to take on more risk.
A comparison of the effects of short-term and long-term incentives is useful.
A marginal increase in either leads to an identical increase in the expected payoffs
to the manager from increasing risk. However, the long-term component exposes
her to the risk associated with terminal cash flows, while the short-term compo-
nent exposes her to the interim stock price, the riskiness of which is not affected
by project choice. Thus long-term incentives are costly in terms of risk levels,
while short-term incentives are not. Because her utility is concave, increasing the
manager’s long-term incentives has a greater impact on the cost of risk to her than
on the benefit, and she reduces risk. Since increasing short-term incentives only
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affects the manager’s benefit from increasing risk, doing so leads to a straightfor-
ward increase in risk chosen.
Long-term incentives cause the manager to choose an inefficiently low level
of risk. Proposition 1 demonstrates that equilibrium project risk increases with
short-term incentives. Is it possible that sufficiently strong short-term incentives
actually lead the manager to destroy value by taking on excessive risk? The an-
swer is no, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 8. For any given level of long-term incentives, the manager chooses ineffi-
ciently low project risk, regardless of the strength of short-term incentives.
Proof. From (4.11), µ′ > 0 for any β2 > 0, so σ2x < σ̂2x . 
Intuitively, short-term incentives force the manager to take greater account of
the expected payoff of the project in her project choice decision. Expected project
payoff is maximized when the chosen payoff variance is σ̂2x . Increasing the vari-
ance beyond this point not only increases the risk faced by the manager due to her
long-term incentives, but also reduces expected project payoff. Therefore, short-
term incentives, no matter how strong, do not induce the manager to take on ex-
cessive risk. Note that the model is characterized by full symmetric information.
We show later that, in the presence of asymmetric information about the return
to risk, sufficiently strong short-term incentives can in fact induce the manager to
destroy value by taking on too much risk as she seeks to communicate to outside
investors favorable information about the return to risk.
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Long-term incentives are needed to mitigate private benefits consumption but
can bias the manager against taking risk. Adding short-term incentives to the
manager’s contract can benefit shareholders by improving managerial risk-taking.
However, the resulting increase in risk imposes a cost on the manager, for which
she must be compensated. Whether including short-term incentives in the man-
ager’s contract is optimal depends on the tradeoff between the benefit of im-
proved risk-taking and the cost of imposing more risk on the manager. We now
investigate this tradeoff and show that it is indeed optimal to include short-term
incentives in the manager’s contract.
4.1.5 Optimal short- and long-term incentives
We proceed in two steps. In the first, we take the long-term incentive compo-
nent of the manager’s contract, β2, as given and investigate the optimal level of
short-term incentives, β1. We then allow the long-term component of the contract
to be chosen optimally and derive the resulting optimal contract. Taking β2 as















Substituting for µ′ from (4.11), we have as the solution to shareholders’ problem:
β1 = 1− β2. (4.16)
To understand this result, note that the inefficiency created by long-term incen-
tives arises from the fact that, while the manager takes full account of the marginal
cost of the risk imposed on her, she only takes into account a fraction β2 of the
marginal value created by taking on more risk. When short-term incentives are
included in the contract, she instead internalizes a fraction β1 + β2 of the marginal
value created. By setting β1 + β2 = 1, shareholders are able to induce the man-
ager to fully internalize the marginal value creation, and the constrained first best
obtains. That is, β1 = 1− β2 yields the most efficient outcome possible given the
cost imposed by the inclusion of long-term incentives in the contract.
This result is, perhaps, better understood in the context of a manager-owned
firm which is facing a project choice problem. In this context, the result says that
the manager should keep in her possession only the amount of shares that are nec-
essary to optimally assure the outside shareholders about her incentives to con-
sume private benefits. The rest of the shares should, then, be sold off in an IPO,
since they would be valued more highly by risk-netural outside shareholders. Put
another way, this result can be interpreted as saying that managers should con-
sider choosing the risk levels of projects prior to undertaking an IPO as opposed
to reserving the choice for later on. However, the result assumes that managers
do not have wealth constraints which preclude them from taking on any projects
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prior to doing an IPO. In later versions of the paper, we will incorporate the effect
of managerial wealth constraints directly.
We now consider the optimal level of both short- and long-term incentives in








x + B− φ(B)}. (4.17)
We now show that the optimal contract includes both short- and long-term incen-
tives.
Proposition 9. The optimal contract includes both short- and long-term incentives.
Proof. The first order condition for the strength of short-term incentives is as








+ [1− φ′(B)] dB
dβ2
= rβ2σ2x . (4.18)
Substituting from (4.4), (4.6) and (4.15) into (4.18), we have
1− β2
φ′′(B)β32
= rβ2σ2x . (4.19)
As β2 → 0+, the left-hand side goes to ∞ while the right-hand side goes to 0. As
β2 → 1−, the left-hand side goes to 0, while the right-hand side goes to rσ2x , which
is greater since (4.15) and the assumption that µ′(0) = ∞ imply that µ > 0 for
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any β2 < ∞. Given the continuity of φ, it must be that the solution β2 ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, β1 = 1− β2 must also lie in (0,1). 
In the absence of long-term incentives, the manager consumes unlimited pri-
vate benefits. Because the marginal cost of private benefits increases with private
benefits consumed, it is worth providing some long-term incentives to reduce
their consumption. In the absence of short-term incentives, the manager takes
into account only a fraction β2 of the benefit of increasing risk but all of the cost.
Thus she chooses too little risk, even taking into account the cost of the risk im-
posed on her, for which she must be compensated. Thus it is optimal to provide
some short-term incentives to improve risk-taking.
We have, to this point, assumed that the stock market perfectly forecasts the
long-term value of the firm, making p a deterministic function of σ2x . To allow
for the possibility of stock market forecasting error, we now let the stock price at
t = 1 be p = E[v|Ω1] + εp, where εp is an independent error term with mean
0 and variance σ2p. The manager cannot affect the realization of this error term,
and the error term is uncorrelated with the error in project payoff. Therefore,
once the manager’s contract is in place, the addition of this error term does not
affect her choices of project risk and private benefits consumption. That is, the
results captured by propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold unchanged. However,
incorporating short-term incentives now imposes a direct cost on the manager, for
which she must be compensated, because it exposes her to noise in the short-term
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x) + B− φ(B)}. (4.20)
We show now that both short- and long-term incentives continue to be a part of
the optimal contract, but noise in the stock price reduces the overall strength of
the optimal incentives.
Proposition 10. When the short-term stock price is noisy, the optimal contract includes
both short- and long-term incentives. The short- and long-term incentive components in
the optimal contract sum to less than unity.













x + 2rβ1β2(2β1 + β2)σ
2
p. (4.22)
As β2 → 0+, the left-hand side goes to ∞ while the right-hand side goes to 0. As
β2 → 1−, the left-hand goes to 0 while the right-hand side is positive. Given the
continuity of φ, there must exist a solution β2 ∈ (0, 1). Substituting from (4.11)
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and (4.13) into (4.21) and rearranging, we have




Since β2 < 1, (4.23) implies that β1 > 0. Since β2 > 0, (4.23) implies that β1 < 1.
Finally, β1 > 0 and (4.23) together imply that β1 + β2 < 1. 
To understand the result in terms of the IPO interpretation presented earlier,
this says that the second-best project choice in this context needs to have the man-
ager seek outside financing prior to doing her IPO. Otherwise, by definition, her
total stake in the firm’s shares would add up to 1. Note, however, that in either
case, the manager does not keep for the longer term a stake in the firm that is
greater than what is required to optimally reassure outside shareholders about
the extent of her private benefit consumption.
The analysis thus far has proceeded under the assumption of symmetric infor-
mation about project payoff. In fact, the expected payoff function is assumed to
be deterministic. We now investigate the effect of introducing asymmetric infor-
mation about the expected return to risk.
4.1.6 Short-term incentives and asymmetric information
The model remains the same, except that the relationship between risk and
expected return is now uncertain. Let z denote a random state variable that mea-
sures the expected return to risk. When z is high, taking on risk creates significant
value. When z is low, high risk is undesirable.
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Outside shareholders do not observe z at any point. The manager observes z at
t = 1, before choosing project variance σ2x . Expected project payoff is now µ(σ2x ; z).
The relationship between µ and σ2x is assumed to have the same properties as
before. A high return to risk is good news, so µz > 0. Since the return to risk
increases with z, we assume µσ2x z > 0. It follows directly that σ̂
2
x is increasing in
z - that is, the efficient level of risk is higher in states where the return to risk is
greater. We also assume that the expected project payoff of the risk-free project is
not affected by the state: µz(0; z) = 0.
The manager’s problem remains as in the symmetric information case, expect
for the additional parameter in the expected project payoff function µ:
max
B,σ2x














In the symmetric information case, the stock price was simply equal to the ex-
pected project payoff associated with the chosen risk level less anticipated private
benefits cost. In the asymmetric information case, on the other hand, investors
do not directly observe the state variable that determines the return to risk. So
while they continue to observe the risk choice σ2x , they can no longer be certain of
the associated expected project payoff. However, investors may be able to infer
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something about this state variable from the manager’s risk choice. In a fully sep-
arating equilibrium, this inference is perfect, and we can write z = z(σ2x). Suppose
that such an equilibrium exists. Since the t = 1 stock price p is the expected value
of the firm, we must have
p = µ(σ2x , z(σ
2
x))− φ(B̂). (4.26)
One would expect that the manager would choose a higher level of risk when
the return to risk is higher. In this case, outside shareholders should infer a more
favorable return to risk when they observes a higher level of risk being chosen.
One would expect then that z′(σ2x) > 0. We now show how asymmetric infor-
mation affects the manager’s choice of risk when outside investors make such an
inference.
Proposition 11. Suppose that there exists a fully-separating equilibrium in which the
risk chosen by the manager increases with the return to risk. Then, for any given positive
level of short- and long-term incentives, the manager chooses a higher level of risk under
asymmetric information than under symmetric information.
Proof. The derivative of the short-term stock price function is
dp
dσ2x
= µσ2x + µzz
′(σ2x). (4.27)
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Since µz > 0 and z′ > 0, the equilibrium σ2x is greater than in the symmetric
information case, which can be found in (4.11). 
Intuitively, asymmetric information amplifies the effect of short-term incen-
tives on risk-taking. Short-term incentives give the manager an incentive to in-
crease the short-term stock price. In both the symmetric and asymmetric infor-
mation cases, increasing risk increases the short-term stock price because equilib-
rium return-to-risk is positive. However, in the case of asymmetric information,
investors also infer the risk-return relationship from the manager’s risk choice.
Since investors infer a greater return-to-risk from a higher level of risk, and this
has a positive effect on expected project value, the manager has an extra incentive
to increase risk in the asymmetric information case.
How strong is this extra incentive? In the symmetric information case we
showed that, while short-term incentives increase risk chosen, the manager al-
ways chooses an inefficiently low level of risk. However, one might conjecture
that the incentive to signal return to risk in the asymmetric information case could
lead to excessive risk-taking if short-term incentives are sufficiently strong. In
this case, strong short-term incentives might make the manager willing to destroy
value by increasing risk beyond the optimal level. We investigate this possibility
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now. To make the problem more tractable, we assume a specific functional form
for expected project payoff µ that results in a fully separating equilibrium.
4.1.7 Specific example
We now assume a specific functional form for the relationship between risk
and expected payoff: µ(σ2x ; z) = zσx − 12 σ2x . This functional form satisfies all of
our assumptions about µ. The first best level of risk is σ̂2x = z2. The manager’s
maximization problem is now
max
B,σ2x
{B + β2[zσx −
1
2






We begin by investigating the solution to the manager’s problem in the symmet-
ric information case as a benchmark. Since investors know the value of the state
variable z, price is calculated simply as p = µ = zσx − 12 σ2x − φ(B̂). The straight-








β1 + β2 + rβ22
. (4.31)
As in the general case, the manager chooses too little risk for β2 > 0, regardless
of β1, since γS < 1 for any β2 > 0. The solution to the manager’s problem under
asymmetric information is slightly more complicated because investors infer the
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value of the state variable z from risk choice σ2x . This affects the relationship be-
tween risk choice and the intermediate stock price. The solution to the manager’s








β1 + β2 + rβ22 − 2rβ1β2
. (4.33)
Since z = σx/γA, the equilibrium is fully separating. Equilibrium short-term stock
price is




First, note that γA > γS. As shown in proposition 5, for any return to risk
z > 0, the manager chooses a greater level of risk under asymmetric information
than under symmetric information. This reflects the incentive to signal a high
return-to-risk state by choosing a high level of risk. Second, note that, unlike
γS, γA need not be less than 1. Since the first best level of risk is σ2x = z2, this
implies that the manager may actually chooses too much risk, destroying firm
value in the process. Whether the manager chooses too little or too much risk in
the asymmetric information case depends on the relative intensity of short- and
long-term incentives. This is captured in the following proposition:
Proposition 12. Under asymmetric information, the manager chooses inefficiently low
risk if β1 <
rβ2
1+2rβ2













Asymmetric information amplifies the effect of short-term incentives on risk-
taking. If these incentives are sufficiently strong, then the manager is willing to
destroy long-term value in order to signal a high return to risk.
To get a greater sense of the strength of the incentives in the optimal contract,
we next examine a numerical example.
4.1.8 Numerical example
For the numerical example, we confine our analysis to the case where the re-
lationship between expected return and risk is deterministic and common knowl-
edge. We assume that µ = 10σx − 12 σ2x . We further assume that r = 3, σ2p = 25,
and φ = B + 5B2. The solution to this numerical example will clearly change with
the assumptions we make about these primitives. Our objective is not to examine
all possible cases, but rather to show that reasonable assumptions result in an op-
timal contract with reasonable sensitivities of managerial compensation to short-
and long-term stock price.
The first best level of project variance is σ2x = 100, which yields expected
project value of µ = 50. The first best level of private benefits is B = 0. This
first best outcome provides a benchmark against which the efficiency loss of sec-
ond best outcomes can be measured. Suppose first that only long-term incentives
are available (β1 = 0). Then the optimal contract entails β2 = 0.120. With this sen-
sitivity to long-term performance, the manager chooses σ2x = 54.07. This reduces
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the expected payoff on the project from the first best 50 to µ = 46.50. The manager
consumes private benefits of B = 0.73. Total surplus is 41.91.
Now suppose that short-term incentives can also be included in the contract.
The optimal level of long-term incentives is now β2 = 0.127. However, the opti-
mal contract now also includes β1 = 0.108. With this contract in place, the man-
ager chooses σ2x = 68.40, which yields µ = 48.50. This represents an improvement
of 2.00 to the expected payoff on the project from the case in which short-term
incentives are unavailable. However, since the manager faces more risk, both be-
cause short-term incentives themselves are risky and because she chooses a higher
level of project risk, total surplus increases by a slightly smaller (but still consid-
erable) amount to 43.39. The manager consumes private benefits of B = 0.68.
Suppose now that the manager has a reservation utility of 9.302. Then, when
short-term incentives are not available, she receives a fixed wage of α = 4.403 in
the optimal contract. This fixed wage allows her to earn exactly her reservation
utility when β2 = 0.120. If short-term incentives are allowed in the contract, then
her fixed wage falls to α = 0 in the new optimal contract. That is, when β2 = 0.128
and β1 = 0.107, α = 0 ensures that the manager earns exactly her reservation
utility in equilibrium. Thus it is optimal in this case for outside shareholders to
completely eliminate the manager’s fixed wage in order to give her the optimal
level of short-term incentives.
Suppose now that σ2p = 0 instead of σ2p = 25. This, obviously, does not change
the optimal β2 when the contract includes only long-term incentives. Suppose
that the firm’s shareholders are constrained to provide a contract that holds the
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manager to reservation utility of 9.302 and non-negative fixed wage (α ≥ 0). By
construction, the optimal contract when σ2p = 25 satisfies these two constraints.
However, when σ2p = 0, the optimal contract that satisfies these two constraints
sets β1 = 0.102 and β2 = 0.123.
Thus the optimal contract that satisfies the manager’s reservation utility con-
straint with equality and the non-negative wage constraint provides the manager
with a higher ownership of stock at time 0 when the short-term stock price vari-
ance is higher. This is somewhat striking. One of the chief predictions of principal-
agent theory is that an agent’s incentives should be weaker when risk is greater.
A lengthy empirical literature has failed to find support for this prediction. In
this example, the agent’s incentives measured at time 0 can, indeed, be argued to
be stronger when risk in the short-term stock price is higher. This suggests that
one possible explanation for the failure of the predicted incentive-risk relationship
of the principal-agent model is that empirical research has ignored the temporal
structure of incentives. While the example is only suggestive, it is our conjecture
that this feature is quite general. In the next version of the paper, proving this
conjecture will be a central goal.
The fact that ignoring the temporal distribution of equity-based incentives can
lead to possibly wrong conclusions can be illustrated also in other contexts. In the
next section, we examine a specific strategic decision that impacts firm risk: how
much to diversify the firm’s assets.
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4.2 Diversification decisions and short-term incentives
We have shown that the temporal structure of a manager’s compensation con-
tract affects her incentives when she makes choices that determine the risk of her
firm’s cash flows. One particular choice that affects cash flow risk is the degree
of diversification in the firm’s operations. Combining operations that generate
imperfectly-correlated cash flows reduces total cash flow risk. Thus, a manager
whose compensation is highly-dependent on the firm’s stock price, may have an
incentive to reduce the risk she faces through diversification of her firm’s oper-
ations. This insight has formed the basis for papers examining the relationship
between corporate conglomeration and the sensitivity of managerial pay to stock
price performance (e.g. Amihud and Lev 1981, May 1995, Aggarwal and Samwick
2003). These papers test the hypothesis that an increase in the sensitivity of man-
agerial pay to stock price, other things being equal, leads to more conglomeration.
However, our analysis in the previous section suggests that this hypothesis
may not well-founded since such it ignores the time dimension associated with
such stock-based incentives. As we have shown, whether an increase in the sen-
sitivity of managerial pay to stock price predisposes the manager to take on less
or more risk depends on whether the added incentives are linked to the long-
or short-term stock price. This suggests that a test of the link between conglom-
eration and pay-performance sensitivity which ignores the temporal structure of
compensation is incomplete.
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To further explore this idea, we modify the model of the previous section to
examine a manager’s incentives to diversify her firm. Specifically, we re-cast the
manager’s risk choice as an allocation problem. The firm has access to 1 unit of
capital. The manager chooses an allocation of this capital between a good project,
which we call project G, and a bad project, which we call project B. Any amount
between 0 and 1 unit of capital can be allocated to each of these projects, with the
amounts allocated to the two projects summing to 1. We omit the private benefits
consumption choice in this section since we will not try to derive the optimal
contract. Thus, the allocation of resources between the projects is the manager’s
only choice in this section.
Let δ denote the amount of capital allocated to project G. Then 1− δ units of
capital are allocated to project B. The timing of the model remains the same as in
the previous section, except that there are now two project payoffs at time t = 3
instead of one. The payoff of projects G and B are xG and xB respectively. The
total payoff of the firm’s investments is simply x = xB + xB. Since there are no
private benefits, this is also the terminal value of the firm: v = x. The payoffs
of the two projects have the same constant per unit variance σ2. For simplicity,
the project payoffs are assumed to be uncorrelated. Thus the total variance of the
payoff from the firm’s investments is
var(x) = [δ2 + (1− δ)2]σ2. (4.35)
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The expected payoffs of projects G and B are µG(δ) and µB(1− δ) respectively.
Both projects are assumed to exhibit declining returns to scale: µ′i > 0 and µ
′′
i < 0
for i ∈ {G, B}. The only distinction between the two projects is that the good one
has a higher marginal return at any level of capital k: µ′G(k) > µ
′
B(k). Since the
good project exhibits a higher marginal return to investment, the efficient invest-
ment policy allocates more than 1/2 of a unit of capital to the good project and,
since the allocations must sum to one, less than 1/2 of a unit to the bad project.




Since the good project has a higher marginal return at any level of capital, the
solution to (4.36) must satisfy δ > 1/2. To ensure that the efficient allocation δ is
interior on (0, 1), we assume that µ′B(0) > µ
′
G(1).
Risk-neutral outside shareholders care only about the expected total payoff
from the firm’s investments. The risk-averse manager, however, cares also about
the variance of the total payoff if her compensation is exposed to it. The availabil-
ity of two projects provides the manager a means of reducing firm risk through
diversification. This can be seen by taking the derivative of (4.35) with respect to
the allocation to project G:
dvar(x)
dδ
= 2(1− 2δ)σ2. (4.37)
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The expression in (4.37) is negative when δ > 1/2. Since efficient investment re-
quires δ > 1/2, reducing risk through diversification involves shading the amount
of capital invested in project G downward towards 1/2, and, complementarily,
shading the amount of capital invested in project B upward towards 1/2.
We now examine how the structure of the manager’s compensation contract
affects her incentive to engage in such diversification of the firm’s cash flows.
Formally, the manager’s problem is
max
δ




2 + (1− δ)2]σ2}. (4.38)
The following proposition establishes how the manager’s compensation structure
affects the manager’s choice of investment.
Proposition 13. If the manager’s contract includes long-term stock price-based incen-
tives, she diversifies excessively. The extent of diversification increases with long-term
incentives and decreases with short-term incentives.
Proof. Outside investors observe δ and form prices rationally, so p = µG(δ) +
µB(1− δ). With this formula for p substituted into the manager’s problem, the







Let δ∗ denote the solution to (4.36) and δ∗∗ the solution to (4.39). Suppose that
δ < 1/2. Then the denominator of the left-hand side of (4.39) is negative. The
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the first and third inequalities follow from the fact that µ′′G < 0 and µ
′′
B < 0 re-
spectively, and the second from the fact that µ′G(k) > µ
′
B(k) for any capital level
k. In this case, the left-hand side is negative of (4.39) is negative while the right-
hand side is positive, so δ cannot be less than 1/2. Suppose instead that δ = 1/2.
Then the left-hand side of (4.39) is infinite, while the right-hand side is finite, so
δ cannot be 1/2. Therefore, it must be that δ > 1/2. Since δ > 1/2, it must be
that µ′A(δ) > µ
′
B(1− δ). Therefore, it must be that δ∗∗ < δ∗. An increase in β1
requires a decrease in the left-hand side of (4.39), which means δ must increase.
An increase in β2 requires an increase in the left-hand side of (4.39), which means
δ must decrease. 
Efficient investment entails investing more than half of the firm’s capital in the
good project. Taking efficient investment as the starting point, the manager can
reduce the risk of the firm’s cash flows by dropping the allocation to the good
project below the efficient level. As in the previous section, long-term incentives
predispose the manager to reduce risk. Because of the continuity of µA and µB,
the cost of deviating a small amount from efficient investment is low. Therefore
the manager indeed chooses to invest too little in the good project and, in conse-
quence, too much in the bad project. Put differently, she reduces the firm’s natural
focus on its higher-return investment in order to diversify the firm’s cash flows.
As her long-term incentives increase, the cost of the risk she bears increases,
and she therefore diversifies more to reduce this cost. Short-term incentives again
serve the role of attenuating the manager’s bias against risk. When she chooses
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too much diversification, a shift of capital from the bad project to the good project
increases the expected total payoff of the firm’s investments. Since outside in-
vestors form rational expectations, this increases the firm’s short-term stock price.
Therefore linking her pay to the short-term stock price reduces her bias towards
diversification, making investment more efficient. However, no amount of short-
term incentives will make the manager focus excessively. Increasing investment
in the good project beyond the efficient level not only increases the risk faced by
the manager, but also leads to a reduction in the short-term stock price.
Proposition 7 shows that how the intensity of a manager’s equity-based incen-
tives affect her disposition towards diversification depends on the time horizon
of the incentives. This result confirms the importance of considering the time
horizon of equity-based managerial incentives when testing the the effect of such
incentives of conglomeration. An increase in short-term incentives has a predicted
effect on conglomeration that is the opposite of the predicted effect of an increase
in long-term incentives.
4.3 Conclusion
The importance of using stock price-based compensation to align the interests
of management and shareholders is well-accepted. However, aligning incentives
in this manner imposes significant risk costs on the manager which, in equilib-
rium, she must be compensated for. Alternatively, equity-based long-term com-
pensation may give managers incentives to reduce risk at the expense of share-
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holder value. However, optimally adjusting the temporal composition of such
incentives can ameliorate the negative effects on risk choice such incentives have.
This is possible because market prices will reflect the effect of the manager’s in-
centives on her risk choices. But, in order to attain such benefits, the manager
must be allowed to take advantage of short-term prices by trading out of some
of her equity-linked claims. As a result, trying to rigidly align managerial com-
pensation to those of long-term shareholders who can diversify may not be in the
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